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Abstract 
Public policy is often conceptualized as a decision-making process, comprised of 
different stages or steps. Consequently, there is a tendency to view and examine policy as 
a linear and rational process, as well as a tendency to overlook language use as an 
important part of policy processes and decisions. Conceiving policy as discourse 
complicates policy conceptualizations, and posits alternative, non-linear, non-rational 
policy paths and elements. This thesis is an examination of policy as non-linear and non-
rational. Specifically, and in light of recent economically, fiscally and politically 
challenging years for government in the province of Alberta, I examine government 
Throne and Budgetary Agenda Speeches from a previous, similar period of challenging 
economies and finances in the 1980s and early 1990s. I argue that language use in these 
agendas is an important part of what governments do.  
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Introduction 
The Alberta government recently faced several years of fiscal deficits. After 
fourteen years of surpluses, it recorded a deficit of $852 million in 2008. The government 
has since recorded two deficit budgets, and is forecasting a deficit of $1.4 billion for 
2012-13. The current string of deficits is a sharp turnaround from years of plenty, 
including a record surplus of $8.5 billion posted in 2005.  
The possible cause of Alberta’s recent fiscal imbalances has elicited a range of 
explanations and solutions from academics, pundits, and politicians. On the one side are 
those, including the Official Opposition Wildrose Alliance Party, who argue the 
Conservative government has a spending problem that can best be met through 
expenditure cuts. This view is broadly shared by several economists, including Emery 
and Kneebone (2009) who, recalling the province’s deficits from the 1980s and early 
1990s, have urged greater government control of spending. As well, Atkins and Latouche 
(2011) locate former Premier Ed Stelmach’s lack of expenditure control as the primary 
cause of Alberta’s current “deficit dysfunction” and “deficit mess.” Writing for the Fraser 
Institute, a prominent right-wing public policy think-tank, Mark Milke (2011) argues that 
Alberta’s “overspending” is the cause of its structural deficits and its depleting net 
financial assets. Milke warns that unless spending is controlled, Alberta is in danger of 
revisiting its past history of spiralling deficits and accumulating debt; hence the title of 
his commentary – Alberta’s finances: Welcome back to the 1980s.  
Government overspending alone is an arguably narrow explanation for the 
province’s deficits, both past and present, however. Many political observers argue 
Alberta’s deficits stem from the uncertainties of its boom and bust economy. Boothe 
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(1995), for example, argues that the provincial deficits of the 1980s occurred partly 
because resource revenues dropped dramatically, placing considerable pressure on 
provincial finances, particularly because during the earlier boom times the government 
had expanded services and infrastructure to keep pace with a booming economy and 
rapidly growing population. Taking an even longer view, Mansell (1997) argues that 
Alberta’s dependence on oil and gas, from the 1960s onward, has played a major role in 
both its economy and finances. Indeed, fast forwarding to the 2010 Budget Address, the 
government argued that Alberta’s latest deficits were the result of poor resource revenues 
and the “worst economic recession since the 1930s” (Alberta, 2010); a general argument 
given a new twist in the government’s 2013 budget by its insistence that its deficit was 
caused by a “bitumen bubble” (Alberta, 2013).1  
Returning to the “overspending” argument, one might ask, “Overspending in what 
area(s)?” “Was (and is) the government engaged in wholesale overspending, or was 
overspending limited to particular areas and programs?” Peter Lougheed’s governments 
of the 1970s and early 1980s significantly increased social spending in areas of 
healthcare, education and social assistance, and since the late 1970s these policy areas 
have accounted for upwards of 70 percent of government expenditures in a given year, 
but are these examples of over-spending or of judicious and necessary investments? Not 
to be forgotten, moreover, are government expenses  and subsidies relating to the private 
sector, which Taft (1997) argues also increased significantly under Lougheed’s 
                                                          
 
1 The government defines the “bubble” as the difference between Western Canadian 
Select (oil produced in Alberta) and other oil prices, such as West Texas Intermediate. 
The price for Alberta’s oil was lower in 2012 due to a number of factors, including 
demand, quality, and transportation issues (Alberta, 2013). 
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governments, as well as a set of failed private sector investments by the government in 
the 1980s that cost the provincial government billions of dollars (see Laxer and Harrison, 
1995; Smith, 1992).  
On the other side of the debate are those who argue Alberta’s recurrent fiscal 
problems are not caused by over-spending but rather a chronic absence of sufficient 
revenue. Writing in 1995, journalist Mark Lisac queried whether Alberta had a spending 
problem or a tax problem; an argument made also by Laxer and Harrison (1995) who 
stated the government could have easily wiped out its deficit and debt from the 1980s and 
1990s if it had tax rates close to the national average. More recently, Flanagan (2011) has 
argued that Alberta’s low tax rates are a contributing factor to its recurrent deficits. A 
report published in 2013 by Parkland Institute, a left-wing think-tank, states that Alberta 
“could collect nearly $11 billion more in taxes and remain the country’s lowest-tax 
jurisdiction” (Bower et al., 2013, p. 1). But this argument is not made only by the left. 
Jack Mintz, a prominent economist with the School of Public Policy at the University of 
Calgary, has publically recommended that Alberta adopt a sales tax in order to stabilize 
its revenues (Graveland, 2013). Likewise, while arguing for expenditure controls, Emery 
and Kneebone (2009) have called for “strategic” tax increases as long as they do not 
hinder economic growth.2    
                                                          
 
2 There are also those who argue that Alberta’s deficits are a product of both over-
expenditure (or unwise expenditures) and insufficient revenues. Reid (2001), for 
example, attributes Alberta’s deficits in the late 1980s to both decreased resource 
revenues and a dramatic increase in public expenditures on health care, education and 
social services that occurred during Lougheed’s last term as Premier. 
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Issues of government spending, revenue, deficit, and debt are extremely complex, 
and how one views them depends largely on one’s policy perspective. Indeed, fiscal 
policy is often a tool or means to reach social and economic ends. Though dealing with 
these issues at the national level, Hale (2001) offers in the following passage some 
insight into the issues of deficits and debt in the early 1990s and their broader 
implications:  
By the early 1990s, the failure of successive governments to…. build a national 
political consensus around the size and role of government had left Canada's 
public finances in a shambles with rising taxes, declining levels of public services, 
and shrinking living standards for most of its citizens. In response, a broad 
political and public consensus gradually emerged in support of deficit reduction 
and balanced budgets, more disciplined public spending (and private demands on 
government), and a more selective approach to government intervention in order 
to set Canada's economic house in order (p.14). 
Hale’s comments also shed light on the Alberta experience. As I noted above, the 
province’s fiscal issues, both past and present are the subject of debate and bitter conflict. 
Furthermore, and perhaps more to the point, the state is often at the centre of this debate 
and must therefore try to build a consensus – not only in terms of how these social, 
economic and fiscal issues are understood and addressed, but ultimately, a consensus that 
will show the government as a competent steward in these policy areas. Indeed, while 
many of the above arguments regarding the causes of past and present provincial deficits 
seek to advise government policy, they often also discredit and lay blame upon 
government.  
Given the province’s recent fiscal climate, its recent economic difficulties, and the 
criticisms and warnings discussed above, it is an opportune time to examine how 
Alberta’s Conservative governments understood and responded to the deficits in the 
1980s and early 1990s. Peter Lougheed, Don Getty and Ralph Klein, Alberta’s premiers 
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during this period, faced issues and circumstances similar to those recently experienced 
by premiers Stelmach, Redford, and now Prentice. This thesis is an examination of 
government policy from the 1980s and early 1990s, with a specific interest in the issue of 
the deficit, how it was articulated, and where it stood on the government agenda during 
the more challenging economic years. The specific years of interest are 1983 and 1984 
(Lougheed); 1987, and 1992 (Getty); and 1993 (Klein). I will discuss this choice of years 
below in a review of the literature.  
The following three questions are important to my analysis of policy in these 
years. What were government priorities during these years, and where did the issue of the 
deficit sit within these priorities? What problems were seen to be at the heart of the 
deficit? And lastly, what solutions did the government seek? To guide my analysis I 
borrow terms and concepts from policy studies and policy analysis – two related, but 
separate disciplines that comprise the broad discipline of the policy sciences.3 From 
policy studies I adopt several concepts that are fundamental to an understanding of public 
policy. These concepts underpin the central research questions posed above, and locate 
my policy interests within the agenda-setting and issue salience research of the broader 
policy studies literature.  
I augment these fundamentals, and these questions, with a conceptualization of 
policy as discourse, provided by critical discourse theory and the policy analysis 
literature. Doing so holds ontological and epistemological implications for this thesis, and 
                                                          
 
3 The distinction between policy studies and policy analysis is not consistently made 
within the literature. The distinction I draw upon comes from Howlett et al. (2009). I will 
elaborate in the theory section below.  
6 
 
underscores the importance of examining the language of policy – a notion (and exercise) 
acknowledged, but often underdeveloped in the policy literature. I found that much of the 
policy I have analyzed concerned a discursive priority of consensus, and that consensus 
seeking is a fundamental activity of agenda-setting. This priority is never explicitly stated 
or acknowledged in government policy, but I argue that policy is constructed 
interactively, taking into account different people and groups within the legislative 
assembly and the broader policy context to this end. In addition to outlining priorities that 
involve balancing the budget, or raising taxes, or spurring the economy, or running a 
deficit, for example, governments also seek approval or consensus for their policies. I 
will explore this in my analysis of government agendas and priorities, with a particular 
interest in the deficit. What I argue is that the agenda-setting research pay greater 
attention to language use in theory and method, and that future studies of policy in 
Alberta place greater emphasis on this approach.  
Over the next three chapters, I will elucidate the conceptualization of policy I 
have briefly discussed in this introduction. Chapter one discusses and weds policy studies 
theory with critical discourse analysis. Chapter two describes the methods of analysis 
used in this thesis and provides additional theoretical insight into the kinds of policy 
documents that I have analyzed. Chapter three provides an overview of the political, 
fiscal and economic context during the years of interest to this analysis, and policies 
pursued by successive Alberta governments. This chapter provides a review of the 
literature and identifies the unique insights this thesis offers. The four chapters that 
follow proceed with an analysis of the policy agendas pursued under the respective 
Lougheed, Getty, and Klein regimes. The concluding chapter substantiates several 
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theoretical claims made in the opening chapters regarding the importance of conceiving 
government agendas as language use and discursive practice. It also provides suggestions 
for future research in this area of provincial policy.  
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Chapter One: Theory 
This chapter provides a conceptualization of public policy. I begin with a 
discussion of several foundational terms and concepts from the policy sciences. I follow 
with a discussion of policy as discourse, in which I borrow terms and concepts from 
critical discourse analysis. As policy sciences and discourse analysis are both very broad 
theoretical and methodological disciplines, it is important to note at the outset that my 
discussion is selective and limited, meant to draw out what I consider to be the relevant 
terms and concepts in answering the research questions posed above.  
The Policy Sciences 
The policy sciences emerged shortly after the Second World War as governments 
throughout Europe and North America began taking a greater role in the economic and 
social well-being of their citizens. As the state increased in complexity and size there 
developed a need and desire to understand and analyze its activities (Kernaghan and 
Siegel, 1995). As Inwood (1999) argues, many areas of government became actively 
debated and researched. The policy sciences consequently emerged as a discipline that 
sought to research, understand, influence and advise governments.4  
Policy science has since branched into two fields of inquiry known as policy 
studies and policy analysis. Discussing the difference between the two, Dobuzinskis et al. 
(2007) assert that the former is of policy (policy studies tends to descriptive), while the 
                                                          
 
4 McCool (1995) attributes the establishment of the policy sciences to Harold Lasswell, 
who highlighted several characteristics of the discipline he hoped would help democratic 
governments run more smoothly. In particular, Lasswell (1966) argued for a science of 
democracy that was “restricted to the understanding and possible control of the factors 
upon which democracy depends.” 
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latter is for policy (policy analysis tends to be prescriptive). This difference is discussed 
in greater detail below. 
Those interested in policy are drawn from a variety of professional and academic 
disciplines such as government, economics, anthropology, sociology and political 
science. One consequence of this variety of disciplinary influences is that definitions of 
public policy are similarly quite diverse. Thomas Dye’s definition, given in 1987, is 
commonly cited, however: that public policy is “whatever governments chose to do or 
not to do” (quoted in Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, 2009, p. 4; see also Kernaghan and 
Siegel, 1995). Wharf and McKenzie (2004) expand on this definition when they argue 
that public policy encompasses “all the actions of governments in their continuing but not 
always consistent attempts to regulate social and economic structures and citizens’ 
quality of life” (p. 17). Anderson (1975) argues that public policy is a course of action 
taken by an actor in dealing with a problem or matter of concern. Lastly, Doern and 
Phidd (1983) argue that public policy is a set of decisions by a political actor or group 
involving the selection of both goals and the means of achieving those goals. 
Two important elements of public policy stand out from the above definitions. 
First, public policy is understood as a government action, output or whatever 
governments do (or do not do). Indeed, Inwood (1999) argues that public policy can be 
any number of government activities, including passing a law, raising taxes, spending 
money, having a royal commission, or even formulating and giving a speech. The second 
important aspect of public policy gleaned from the above definitions is that government 
actions or outputs are choices, both in terms of what to do and how to do it, that are 
intended to address a particular problem.  
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Policy studies. Dobuzinskis et al. (2007) assert that policy studies is undertaken 
mainly by academics and “is generally concerned with understanding the development, 
logic, and implications of overall state processes and the models used by investigators to 
analyze those processes” (p. 5). The concept of process is fundamental to policy studies. 
Although there is no universal policy process identified within the literature, most 
authors, if only heuristically, posit some form of process that is comprised of stages or 
steps involving different inputs and outputs. For example, both Howlett, Ramesh and Perl 
(2009), and Wharf and Mackenzie (2004) conceive of a five stage policy process that 
involves policy initiation and agenda setting, policy formulation, decision making and 
execution, policy implementation, and policy evaluation. Corresponding to each stage are 
different policy decisions involving, respectively, problem recognition and identification, 
policy assessment and proposal of solution, choice of solution, putting the solution into 
effect, and monitoring results and evaluation.  
The stages of the policy process are often conceived of as processes in 
themselves. This theoretical approach has anchored an expansive lexicon and body of 
taxonomies that seek to interrogate and understand policy and its various parts and 
processes. For this study, I find some taxonomies and terms of more value for a 
conceptualization and examination of policy than others. In particular, I am interested in 
those stages that involve policy initiation and agenda setting, and policy formulation. 
Furthermore, I pay more attention to the outputs, that is to say, the end results of those 
stages as opposed to the respective processes that may have led to those outputs. 
Consequently, my examination of policy as process is selective.  
11 
 
In concrete terms, I am interested in the priorities, problems/issues and proposed 
solutions of Alberta’s Conservative governments during previous times of economic 
difficulty and deficit budgets; hence, the attention given in this study to the first and 
second stages (agenda setting and policy formulation) of the policy process model 
outlined above.  
My limited examination of the policy process stems in part from the criticism that 
process models tend to portray policy making as a rational, linear set of decisions.5 As the 
argument goes, adhering too strictly to process models overlooks the complexities and 
“messiness” of policy (Shore and Wright, 1997). Drawing attention to this messiness, 
Wharf and Mackenzie (2004) argue that in the real world of policy making, different 
social actors and groups, carrying “conflicting ideas, values and needs, compete with one 
another, often on unequal grounds” (p. 14). Shore and Wright (1997) similarly assert that 
policy processes are inherently political, and “shaped by different contexts of interaction 
or social domains as opposed to a linear model of policy making” (p. 8). Drawing 
attention to political institutions, Rochefort and Cobb (1993) point to political pressures, 
bureaucratic structures and time constraints as non-rational variables involved in policy 
making. These arguments point to a number of factors that can influence policy decisions 
and processes. Examining the social, economic and political contexts in which policy 
unfolds draws attention to the messiness of policy processes.  
Howlett et al. (2009) argue that good studies in public policy require looking at 
the interplay between the policy actors who make policy decisions, the social structures 
                                                          
 
5 It also stems from an interest in keeping this project manageable.  
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and institutions within and by which these actors create policy, and the ideas and 
knowledge that are embedded in these structures and otherwise inform policy making 
decisions and deliberations. Put a little differently, good studies of policy take into 
account how people, institutions and ideas interact in complex ways to influence and 
complicate public policy processes. The notion of context problematizes policy 
definitions, as well as process models. In particular, it situates any given policy 
“problem” or “choice” in a particular social, political, economic and historical context. 
Consequently, the policy problems and the decisions of a given government are 
understood not necessarily as objective, real problems or calculated rational decisions. 
Rather, they are viewed as products or outcomes of deliberative and communicative 
processes and practices subject to different influences within particular contexts.  
 In Canada, this approach emphasizes the role of liberal and democratic 
institutions, their underpinning ideas and values, and those actors and groups within these 
institutions who are influential in policy decisions (Doern and Phidd, 1983). Atkinson 
and Chandler (1983) argue that the state must serve the interests of capital because it is 
the primary mode of production upon which the nation depends. Thus, many policies and 
programs within liberal states are designed to support the market economy. Additionally, 
the relationships between different actors and groups involved (or not involved) in these 
policies should be examined with reference to the market economy.  
However, as a democracy, the state is also accountable to a voting public whose 
collective interests and values are often at odds with those that underpin a free market 
economy. Consequently, state officials, particularly those who have the power to make 
policy decisions, must to some extent serve the interests of the public. Special attention 
13 
 
must also be given to how democratic institutions structure and shape social relations 
between the people and groups involved (and again, or not involved) in policy decisions. 
Indeed, “elections, independent political parties, and autonomous interest groups are all 
features of a liberal democracy with which politicians must come to terms” (Atkinson 
and Chandler, 1983, p. 4). I now turn to a discussion of the initial stage of policy under 
investigation in this thesis, Problem Identification and Agenda Setting. I will also briefly 
discuss Policy Formulation and Proposal of Solution, as it is difficult to examine 
government agendas without attention to this stage.  
Problem identification and agenda-setting. Three concepts – issues, problems 
and agendas – are important to an understanding of the initial stage of the policy process. 
Issues generally represent the inputs of this stage, while problems and agendas represent 
the outputs. Issues take on the status of public problems when government officials act 
upon them. Moreover, when issues become public problems they occupy space on a 
government agenda. Sometimes referred to as agenda-setting, this initial stage can be 
viewed as a process in itself whereby issues come to occupy the attention of 
governments, and subsequently, how governments understand, structure and prioritize 
these issues and/or problems. 
Important queries into this stage of policy involve examining the nature and 
source of public issues, and how and why governments come to act on some issues rather 
than others. As Kingdon (1995) argues, governments are constantly presented with 
numerous issues (which he calls subjects or concerns) of concern to different people and 
groups in society, but act on some rather than others. Doern and Phidd (1983) argue that 
some issues arise from within government, while others arise simultaneously from both 
14 
 
within and without. To be sure, some issues never actually reach the attention of 
government officials. Rein and Schon (2004) connect government issues with the overall 
policy context when they argue that “policy issues tend to arise in connection with 
governmental programs, which exist in some policy environment, which is part of some 
broader political and economic setting, which is located, in turn, within a historical era” 
(p. 154).  
According to the literature, an agenda refers to a “list of subjects or problems to 
which government officials, and people outside of government closely associated with 
those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time” (Kingdon, 1995, p.-
12). Birkland (2005) conceives of four different agendas, ranging from the broad agenda 
universe, which contains the issues of all individuals and groups in society, to a much 
more narrow decision agenda, which contains those issues that governments are acting 
upon at a given time. Sometimes issues are actively filtered out by different individuals 
and groups both inside and outside of government (usually something occurring in the 
higher, decision agenda). At other times, issues can be filtered out by the nature of the 
political-economic system and the prevailing ideas and values in society (generally a 
filtering which occurs at the agenda universe).  
Soroka (2002) argues that one purpose of agenda-setting research is to track and 
examine problems as they move on or off (or up and down) the government agenda. 
Similarly, Kingdon (1995) posits the goal of agenda-setting research is to understand 
both how the agenda is composed as it is at any one point in time, and how and why it 
changes over time. He argues that political events and processes, including but not 
limited to changes in public opinion, election results, and changes in leadership or 
15 
 
administration can have powerful effects on government agendas. Mitchell (1995) 
stresses that ordinary citizens have very little control or influence in the agenda-setting 
processes that bring about new public policies or changes to existing policies. He argues 
that the government (and in particular elected officials) ultimately have the power to 
decide what issues enter the government agenda.  
The distinction between issues and problems highlights that government problems 
are often “acted upon” or have gone through some sort of process of interpretation, 
research and/or articulation. Indeed, Atkinson and Chandler (1983) explain that “political 
authorities are not simply receptors of political demands and the state not simply a 
mechanism for sorting out and pronouncing on them” (p. 5). Rather, they argue that 
governments often actively mould, shape and package problems. Doern and Phidd (1983) 
similarly argue that the identification of an issue as a problem often involves concerted 
effort by government officials to define and articulate an issue. Consequently, 
accompanying queries into the nature and source of issues that come to occupy the 
attention of governments are queries regarding the how issues are articulated, particularly 
by government actors, but also by other groups and people in society.  
Policy formulation and proposal of solution. Much like the agenda-setting 
stage, policy formulation is a process in itself that has been extensively researched. 
Consequently, numerous taxonomies and theories have emerged in the literature. 
Generally, examination of this stage draws attention to the process whereby governments 
generate options for dealing with issues or problems. The substance, or output, of policy 
formulation is policy instruments. Sometimes called tools or means, policy instruments 
refer to the approaches governments take to address the “problems” on their agendas. 
16 
 
 Early research into policy instruments presented by Mosher (1982), Hood (1986), 
and Doern and Phidd (1983) classified instruments according to, respectively, 
expenditure or non-expenditure based, the types of action governments take in response 
to policy problems, and, their degree of coercion and regulation in markets and citizen’s 
lives. Recent research into policy instruments has provided insight into the range of 
instruments, their applicability and properties, and the justification for choosing them. 
  In theory, governments have a number of instruments at their disposal. Indeed, 
Linder and Peters (1989) suggest there are upwards of 25 different policy instruments 
available. Yet, despite the apparent abundance of choice, Peters (1990) contends that 
policy makers often rely on a small number of instruments to deal with a range policy 
problems. Hood (2007) offers insight when he advocates for an instrument approach that 
highlights the “politics of policy,” which holds that instrument choice is rarely a matter of 
“neutral deliberation” but rather, strongly influenced by politics, ideology, and culture. 
Brooks (1998) elaborates, arguing the selection of policy instruments is a “messy 
process” that is: 
influenced by how things have been done in the past – by vested bureaucratic, 
political and societal interests; by change, including the individuals involved in a 
decision; and by ideas and beliefs that may or may not be well founded (p. 10). 
Brooks is highlighting the importance of context to policy instrument decisions, which 
speaks to the importance of context in the overall policy process. Any given policy 
instrument is understood as a choice, set against alternatives that were not chosen, or 
perhaps not even considered, due in part to the policy context (actors, ideas and social 
institutions) within which it occurred. The choices or decisions involved in this stage of 
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policy are often constrained or structured to varying degrees due to the social context 
within which they have occurred. 
This discussion is perhaps a little too mechanical for the task at hand, however. 
Taken to the extreme, it affords government officials and those close to them too much 
agency in terms of setting the agenda and articulating the issues therein, and tends to 
promote a one way, top down view of policy making. Moreover it tends to promote 
policy making as a rational, linear decision making process – a view that I argue fails to 
capture the interactional, back and forth, discursive nature in which the issue of the 
deficit, and many other issues, are contested. I argue this view of agenda-setting and issue 
salience tends to overlook the issue (and indeed priority) of consensus seeking embedded 
within government agendas and policy articulations. A conceptualization of the agenda as 
discursive practice will add complexity to this stage, particularly in regards to articulating 
issues. 
Policy analysis. As discussed above, the notion of context draws attention to the 
policy actors and groups who make and influence policy, the institutions within which 
they make these decisions and the ideas and values that are carried by policy actors and 
embedded in institutions. This outlook serves to complicate the policy process and thus 
facilitates a critical examination of policy. However, with its focus on context and 
process, this body of theory tends to overlook an important element at the heart of policy 
– that of language use. This interest, which conceives of policy as discourse, has gained 
significant traction within policy analysis. 
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While policy studies seeks to understand policy and its processes, policy analysis 
seeks to measure and influence policy and its processes.6 Indeed, policy analysts often 
refer to their discipline as policy analysis and planning because their work is intended to 
analyze, create and/or advise policy. Elaborating on what policy analysts do, Dobuzinskis 
et al. (2007) note  that policy analysis grew from the “…efforts made by actors inside and 
outside formal political decision-making processes to improve policy outcomes by 
applying systematic evaluative rationality to the development and implementation of 
policy options” (Forward). To be sure, policy analysts’ efforts to “improve policy 
outcomes” is acknowledged by those engaged in policy studies, and policy analysts are 
consequently recognized as potentially influential actors in policy processes.  
This “systematic evaluative rationality” is guided by positivist ontology and 
epistemology, which taken to extreme, holds that policy problems can be objectively and 
systematically understood and solved. However, these claims have received significant 
critique from within the policy sciences and led to a post-positivist break on the grounds 
that policy analysis is a normative discipline, and thus framed by particular theories, 
methods and language. Critics raise concern over the potential for such analysis to 
regulate governments and otherwise undermine democratic politics and ideals (Dryzek, 
1990). One consequence of this critique is that many policy analysts today are much 
more cognizant of their theoretic and methodological assumptions and choices, and often 
stress the importance of reflexive disclaimers in their analyses (Moran et al., 2006).  
                                                          
 
6 This overly simplistic comparison barely captures the theoretical and methodological 
overlapping between these two disciplines. It does, however, provide a starting point for 
differentiating between them. 
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However, the post-positivist break within policy analysis signals a broader critical 
orientation towards policy. Often referred to as the argumentative movement in policy 
analysis, its proponents contend that public policies are first and foremost arguments or 
acts of persuasion. Highlighting the argumentative nature of policy draws attention to the 
existence of counter or contradictory arguments, issues regarding problem construction, 
and many other “micro-political” aspects of policy processes as they pertain to language 
use (Fischer and Forrester, 1993). Consequently, the argumentative turn can also be 
viewed as a critical orientation towards language. Discussing this turn, Hajer (1993) 
argues that “language lost [its] neutral status and itself became problematized….the use 
of language in political life or political discourse becomes an important object of political 
study” (p. 44). It is precisely this critical orientation towards language use that I wish to 
adopt for this thesis. Policy analysts have turned to discourse analysis to provide the 
theoretical and methodological tools to open up new ways to examine policy.  
Discourse Analysis 
Much like public policy, discourse (and discourse analysis) holds different 
meanings for different people. Consequently, I should note that I borrow from the 
writings of critical discourse analysis (CDA), which posits that language use (written or 
spoken) is a form of social action, and as such, is a way of acting both in and on the 
social world. Fairclough (1992) argues that discourse is shaped and constrained by social 
structure “in the widest sense and at all levels: by class and other social relations at a 
societal level, by the relations specific to particular institutions such as law or education, 
by systems of classification…and so forth” (p. 63). However, he is quick to point out that 
discourse, in addition to being shaped and constrained by social structure, also  
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“constitutes all those dimensions of social structure which directly or indirectly shape and 
constrain it” (Ibid). As a way of acting in the social world, discourse reflects particular 
settings, relations, identities and systems of knowledge. However, that same acting, in 
turn, acts upon the social world, those same settings, relations, identities and systems of 
knowledge to (re)create (and as Fairclough would argue, at times, transform) the social 
world. I conceive of policy as a way of acting communicatively in and on the social 
world, and I seek to understand through discourse theory and methods how, and to what 
effect. 
To conceive of policy as discourse considers policy as constitutive social action, 
and consequently also examines it for its effects on the context within which it emerged. 
Policy is thus not only a reflection or product of specific social relations and structures, 
but it (re)creates those relations and structures, it interacts with them. There is sometimes 
a distinction in the policy studies literature between what governments say and what they 
do. While this approach has undoubtedly guided countless good studies of policy and 
contributed to greater understandings, discourse theory is particularly interested in what 
governments say because, as the argument goes, talk is a form of action.  
Viewing policy as discourse complicates policy in much the same way as the 
notion of context discussed above. To speak of the contextual influences (actors, ideas, 
institutions) on public policy, is similarly to speak of discourse as constrained “in the 
widest sense and at all levels.” Policy (discourse) is a product or outcome of complex 
social processes. While policy studies focusses on context to make this argument, 
discourse analysis places primacy on language. With its focus on language use, discourse 
analysis draws greater attention to the micro-aspects of context, while acknowledging and 
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examining its broader institutional and ideational influences. Policy studies talks of 
contextual influences on policy, and discourse theory provides theoretical and 
methodological tools to examine this influence.   
 Discourse (policy) form and function. Rogers (2004) argues that CDA is “an 
attempt to describe, interpret, and explain the relationship between the form and function 
of language” (p. 4).Those interested in a critical discursive analysis of policy focus on 
various linguistic and grammatical elements (form) of policy discourse, including style, 
content, genre, and storylines (to name a few), to examine the ways in which policy 
functions to (re)produce knowledge and power relations (Hastings, 1998; Liasidou, 
2011), constitute subjectivities (Fiske and Brown, 2006), who is privileged and who is 
silenced by policy (Asthana, 2011), and in general, to paraphrase Fairclough (1992), 
constitute multiple dimensions of social structure.  
Gee’s (2005) discussion of “language-in-use” as a social “building task” provides 
insight into the nature of the dsicursive work that is accomplished through (policy) 
discourse, and what is at stake in this interacting. He argues that we use language in 
society to perform seven fundamental building tasks involving types of activities, 
identity, relationships, significance, social goods (ex. responsibility, blame), make 
connections, and sign systems and knowledge. I find issues of identity and the 
distribution of social goods (issues of responsibility and blame) the most salient to my 
thesis. Regarding the distribution of social goods, Gee (2005) argues:  
We use language to convey a perspective on the distribution of social goods, that 
is, to build a perspective on social goods. For example, if I say “Microsoft loaded 
its operating system with bugs,” I treat Microsoft as purposeful and responsible, 
perhaps even culpable. If I say, on the other hand, “Microsoft’s operating system 
is loaded with bugs,” I treat Microsoft as less purposeful and responsible, less 
culpable. How I phrase the matter has implications for social goods such as guilt 
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and blame, legal responsibility or lack of it, or Microsoft’s bad or good motives 
(p. 12). 
I posit that, much like the everyday language use discussed by Gee, policy contains 
assumptions and propositions regarding identity and issues of blame, and that policy 
agendas interact with people in the broader context in a manner that not only passes on 
information regarding policy priorities, but also, constructs and reconstructs government, 
other subjectivities, and complex policy processes along these lines. I am interested in 
what kinds of identities are embedded in government policies, and who or what is 
assigned blame. My conceptualization of policy as issues/problems and (proposed) 
solutions is accompanied with a conceptualization of policy as an articulation of blame 
and identity, two related issues that are part of government re(constructions) contained in 
agendas that are ultimately set against other competing  articulations in the broader 
context.  
This conceptualization of discourse complicates the rational and linear decision-
making processes posited by policy theory. While “identity” and “blame” issues may not 
necessarily comprise what is done in terms of addressing policy issues, these issues are 
none the less a part of what governments do, they are part of how governments interact. 
Thus, in addition to the non-rational variables of political pressures, bureaucratic  
structures and time constraints involved in policy-making (highlighted above) policy is 
also made-up of non-rational bits and pieces that factor into this decision-making process.  
Policy is about laying and deflecting blame, it is about identity management, it is about 
acting in and upon the social world along these lines, it is about representing decisions in 
particular ways, and at times, about camouflaging the power to make decisions.  
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Fairclough (1992) offers important insight into how discourse (policy) functions 
with his discussion of discourse as a form of social practice, where he posits that 
discourse serves political and ideological functions. He argues that discourse as a 
political practice “establishes, sustains, and changes power relations,” while discourse as 
an ideological practice “constitutes, naturalizes, sustains and changes significations of the 
world from diverse positions in power relations” (p. 67). Indeed, policy is used to locate 
people and groups within society and particular policy relations. Policy rewards some 
people and penalizes others; it identifies and defines who and what is worthy of 
government attention, and who and what is not. This locating often occurs unequally and 
unilaterally, and holds implications for how people live their lives. The fact that this 
locating sometimes goes unnoticed or uncontested is a testament to the ideological work 
that is performed through (policy) discourse. These issues will be explored in the 
analysis, and I will elaborate in the methods section below.  
Discursive policy: agendas, context and issues. Up to this point I have discussed 
discourse as contextualized spoken or written language that acts upon the social world. A 
more interactive view of discourse is offered by Fairclough (1995) when he conceives of 
discourse as a “complex of three elements: social practice, discursive practice, and text” 
(p. 74). Here I am interested in Fairclough’s concepts of text production and discursive 
practices, which together comprise a highly interactive and social set of practices. I 
conceive of government agendas as texts, and thus a moment or instance of Fairclough’s 
discursive practices made up through the social processes of text production, distribution 
and consumption. Although the practices of writing, distributing and consuming a 
government agenda speech might occur as different events (both temporally and 
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spatially), their discursive nature brings them together to the extent that they influence 
one another in complex ways. For example, the manner in which an agenda (along with 
its issues and priorities) is produced and distributed can influence the manner in which it 
is consumed. Conversely, its (anticipated or perceived) consumption can also influence 
its production and distribution. Put a little differently, those involved in the discursive 
practices of producing, distributing and consuming the agenda act upon one another in 
complex ways.  
Some groups that factor into these discursive practices are highlighted in the 
policy studies literature as part of the agenda-setting context, and they include 
government officials who set the agenda, the media, the voting public, business groups, 
and, given that the agenda must be debated and voted upon, those within the legislature 
involved in policy debates. Much of this interaction relies heavily upon social 
conventions, norms, and commonly held beliefs. Furthermore, much of this interaction 
occurs socio-cognitively as anticipation, expectation, assumption and interpretation of 
these conventions and norms. In this sense, those in government who construct and set 
the agenda are (potentially) interacting with those who will consume the agenda in 
complex ways.  
This view of agenda setting challenges process models that tend to portray policy 
as a linear process that is comprised of different stages. These models examine policy as 
it travels through government bureaucracy, and as policy elites make and implement 
policy beyond agenda-setting. Much less attention is given to how policy travels back to 
the agenda-setting context. While it is certainly true that policy moves beyond agenda-
setting, it is also true that it fragments, or travels in different directions – at this stage, 
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back to the agenda-setting context in the form of public speeches and written texts, where 
it is taken up (contested, accepted, [mis]understood, re-contextualized) in diverse ways.  
The deficit is an interesting issue that might be present on a government agenda. I 
classify the deficit as a focusing event – a concept from the policy studies literature that is 
often used to examine large-scale social and political events that happen suddenly and 
affect a significant portion of a population. Examples of focusing events include natural 
disasters, large industrial accidents, wars and terrorist attacks. Because of their 
magnitude, suddenness, and far-reaching consequences, these events and their 
accompanying issues are thrust upon the public consciousness and government agenda. 
Birkland (2005) argues that focus events “spark intense media and public attention” and 
often lead to a search for solutions in the wake of perceived policy failure. He identifies 
the media, academics, government, advocacy coalitions (comprised of different groups 
and people who rally together on common interests and values in the wake of the event), 
and powerful socially and economically elite groups as important actors during focusing 
events (Birkland, 1998). These groups all have an interest in the issues at hand, and 
generally work to either change or maintain current views and policies.  
Although the issue of the deficit may not seem like a prototypical focusing event, 
there are some interesting commonalities. For example, the deficits occurred during 
Alberta’s economic hardships in the 1980s, which were widespread and rapid (perhaps 
less so in the 1990s), consequently, many people were adversely affected at the time and 
had an active interest how economic, social and fiscal policy issues were understood and 
articulated by government.  
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The research interest in examining focusing events lies not necessarily in who 
places a given policy issue on the agenda, but rather, given their importance and far-
reaching effects, how they are understood, articulated and mobilized by different people 
and groups in society. A government’s discussion is but one version of these issues, and 
what governments do is in part a reflection of what is being done and said, has been done 
and said, or is in anticipation of what will be done and said, in the broader policy context.  
Birkland conceives of focus events as times of increased scrutiny of policy and 
government, efforts to deflect blame and reassert policy status quo and existing 
understandings, symbols, and knowledge pertaining to policy issues. As I have already 
discussed in the introduction, albeit briefly, this policy context for Alberta governments 
was (and is) one of intense conflict and debate, and also one of laying and deflecting 
blame, and engaging in identity work. The deficit, social programs, and the economy are 
all pressing issues for government during these periods, and discourse theory is 
particularly suited to complicate issues of power and agency in agenda-setting. While 
policy studies tends to center discussions of power on those who set the agenda, 
discourse theory offers more specificity as it examines the power to articulate, to locate 
blame, to construct and represent, and inasmuch as government agendas are widely 
distributed and consumed, locates power in an unequal means of dissemination. 
However, there is also power in ideas and representations to shape and structure 
government activity. For example, elected officials in a liberal democracy are supposed 
to be and do certain things, particularly in response to the deficit. The presence of a 
budgetary deficit says something about government, which signifies and acts upon people 
(including government officials) in particular ways. It is here where government officials 
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lack power, as they are not only pressed to address the deficit in some way, but also must 
contend with articulations that act upon and construct government and its policies in 
particular ways. Recall the introduction of this thesis, where I cited passages from 
politicians as well as the provincial media, passages that construct government as to 
blame and responsible for the deficit – as having a spending problem and/or a deficit 
dysfunction, for example. An important activity of agenda-setting is seeking and/or 
constructing a consensus within this broader context.  
In this sense, there is a priority of consensus that drives governments in their 
agenda-setting practices, a priority that can be examined through studies of language. 
This conceptualization captures (theoretically) the range of discursive and social 
practices, and the complex issues of power involved in agenda-setting. Antonio 
Gramsci’s (1988) notion of hegemony highlights the role of ideology in consensus 
seeking and constructing. Questions arise regarding how ideologies and dominant ways 
of thinking factor into policy making in Alberta, and how ideologies underpin policies 
that might serve elite economic groups. These questions interrogate power and agency 
issues in agenda-setting and issue salience in the province.  I view consensus as a specific 
priority and activity within a given policy issue, as well as primary goal of agenda-
setting. This priority arguably increases in saliency in difficult economic and fiscal years, 
but I suggest is nonetheless present in agenda-setting generally.   
Summary  
This chapter has provided a conceptualization of public policy as government 
(in)actions and/or outputs as choices, both in terms of what to do and how to do it, 
intended to address particular problems. These concepts are grounded in a particular 
theory of policy as process. The notion of context, with a focus on different actors, ideas 
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and institutions problematizes both policy definitions and process models. In particular, 
the notion of context problematizes and draws attention to the different factors that can 
influence what issues come to be recognized as problems and, how those issues are 
articulated and framed by different policy actors. Furthermore, context challenges an 
overly rational, linear notion of policy models, and posits that policy processes are often 
complex and understood with reference to particular ideas and values, institutions, actors 
and groups.  
My view of policy as contextualized process is enhanced by a view of policy as 
discourse. Both context and discourse problematize policy concepts and processes. 
However, with its focus on language use, discourse analysis is ultimately better suited 
theoretically to complicate rational and linear notions of policy processes. In particular, 
Fairclough’s view of discourse as a complex of text, discursive practices and social 
practice explores the discursive nature of policy and the policy context in ways that 
policy studies does not. Discourse analysis provides the theory and methods to examine 
in greater detail how government agendas interact with all the various elements of the 
context in which they emerged, and vice versa. The particular historical context within 
which I examine agendas was one of increased attention and scrutiny of government and 
its policies. I posit that a discursive priority of consensus is at work at this stage in policy, 
and I aim to examine this issue with particular focus on the issue of the deficit. 
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Chapter Two: Methods 
This chapter details the data used in this study and the procedures applied to their 
analysis, including how terms were selected and coded. Further conceptualization 
regarding policy agendas as discursive practice is also offered. The chapter concludes 
with a summary of my methodological approach.  
Data 
The data used in this study consist of two types of government documents, budget 
and throne speeches. Three major reasons underlay the selection of these documents. 
First, both types of documents contain strong indications of government priorities and 
areas of concern, which the government knows will be given wide media dissemination. 
For example, the government opens each legislative session with the Speech from the 
Throne, during which time they often outline an agenda containing priorities and areas of 
concern for the coming year. The Parliament of Canada (2006) website has the following 
to say regarding the Speech from the Throne:  
Traditionally, the Speech from the Throne reveals the reasons for summoning 
Parliament. It begins with an assessment of social and economic conditions in the 
country. It then declares the Government’s goals and intentions, and outlines its 
policies and legislative agenda 
(http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/House/compendium/web-
content/c_d_speechthrone-e.pdf). 
Likewise, as Kingdon (1995) asserts, the Budget Address is a significant and influential 
aspect of government activity. The Alberta government often referred to the Budget 
Address in the throne speech. For example, in the 1983 Speech from the Throne, the 
government stated: “in due course you will be presented with budget proposals by my 
government to support these priorities and a program of balanced initiatives…” (Alberta, 
1983a, p.7).  
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Second, the two types of documents complement each other, and while the Speech 
from the Throne articulated a broad view of the government priorities, I found it often 
lacked analytic content. By contrast, the Budget Address was a rich document that often 
contained more detailed discussion and articulation of priorities. Indeed, the deficit is a 
fiscal issue, and the Budget Address contains the government’s fiscal policies for the 
year. The Budget Address provides more insight into the dynamics of the policy context, 
and thus warrants attention in this discussion of government agendas and priorities.  
The third reason for choosing these speeches lies in their availability. Both types 
of documents are produced annually (in the case of the budget, sometimes semi-annually) 
and are readily available electronically on the Alberta Hansard website, or as hardcopies 
through the University of Lethbridge library. Both hardcopy and electronic formats were 
used in my analysis. However, I relied primarily on electronic copies.   
Procedures of Analysis  
My research involved a qualitative analysis of primary government documents. 
Esterberg (2002) describes qualitative analysis as a process of making meaning. As both 
the Speech from the Throne and Budget Address are large, rich texts that required several 
readings, I found this assertion a useful guide. Consequently, analysis of these documents 
generally followed an inductive grounded theory approach, which Saldana (2011) 
describes as a method of discerning and constructing patterns, and otherwise 
“meticulously analyzing qualitative data” (p. 6). Following recommendations within the 
literature, I used a two stage coding process of open and focussed coding. In the initial 
stage of open-coding, I attempted to “work intensively with [the] data, identifying themes 
and categories” by remaining open to whatever might or might not emerge (Esterberg, 
2002, p. 158), though remaining informed by policy studies and discourse theory.  
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I conceived of both types of speech documents as broadly indicative of 
government agendas, articulating to varying degrees government priorities, problems and 
solutions to analyze. Although the government often discusses dozens of policy areas in 
these addresses, my focus was on the priorities. For example, the government stated the 
following in the opening of the 1984 Speech from the Throne: “One purpose of this 
address is essentially to set forth the agenda for the Second Session of the 20th 
Legislature. My government will, as part of the agenda, emphasize the following five 
priority areas…” (Alberta, 1984a, p.2). These five priority areas informed my coding for 
that particular document. In the Budget Address, governments often outline some form of 
fiscal strategy or plan consisting of anywhere from two to six priorities; the fiscal strategy 
would inform my coding for that document.  
Also useful to my analysis was the government’s discussion of “priorities,” 
“problems,” “issues,” and “concerns” whose occurrences I noted in the margin.7 Both 
documents often contained headings and sub-headings that I utilized as additional coding 
aids in my meaning-making analysis. However, I did not rely solely on headings or 
government specified priority areas, but remained open to themes that emerged in each 
document. During the second stage of focussed coding I concentrated on the “key themes 
identified during open coding” (Ibid, p. 161). This involved a deeper analysis of how the 
                                                          
 
7 My analysis does not distinguish, as does the policy literature, between issues and 
problems; nor do governments usually make such a distinction, and often use these words 
interchangeably. Thus, issues/concerns/challenges/problems, are all understood broadly 
as potential areas of government policy. 
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themes identified in open coding might be connected, ordered and/or structured (Babbi 
and Benaquisto, 2002; Saldana, 2011).  
I also conducted “keyword” searches for each document in an attempt to capture 
themes in the speeches and respective years. For example, in 1993, Premier Klein’s only 
year of interest for this thesis, the government repeated the word “change” 30 times in the 
Speech from the Throne, and ten times in the Budget Address, far more than either 
Lougheed or Getty in their respective years. As I will discuss below, “change” was an 
important theme for Klein’s government.  
An important part of my analysis involved the reflexive exercise of 
acknowledging my preconceived notions and implicit theorizing regarding government 
policy for the particular periods in question, as well as my normative beliefs and values 
regarding state intervention and activity in society. As Guillemin and Gillam (2004) 
argue, this reflexive “stepping back” speaks to research issues of validity and rigor. 
While I agree with these authors that reflexivity should accompany the entire research 
process, I consider it a particularly salient concern during the coding process and my 
interpretation of government policy. Thus, to reiterate, I strove to remain open to the 
themes that emerged from the data.   
Discourse Analysis 
I view this research as a content analysis informed by discourse theory and 
methods. During the initial stage of coding I recorded – verbatim – government policy. In 
so doing, I captured the language of the respective government on certain issues, and 
placed myself in a position to examine the form, and to a lesser extent, function of policy. 
I have focussed on specific sections and paragraphs of documents where the deficit, and 
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other priorities are discussed. I have not, however, engaged these documents in 
systematic, line by line, and paragraph by paragraph analyses.    
However, there is an interesting theoretical and methodological discussion to be 
had regarding the fact that the government agendas I have examined are not just policy 
(problems/priorities/solutions, decisions, etc.), but public speeches as well. As such, they 
are written, delivered and consumed (interpreted, contested, accepted, etc.) by various 
people and groups. Perhaps the most important of these consumers are the voting public, 
the media, and those within the legislature. Drawing attention to the latter group, albeit 
indirectly, the government closed the 1983 Speech from the Throne in the following 
manner: 
Members of the Legislative Assembly: In due course you will be presented with 
budget proposals by my government to support these priorities and a program of 
balanced initiatives consistent with appropriate restraint in public expenditures. 
You will be asked to grant the necessary funds for the operating services and 
expenditures authorized by the Legislature and to endorse a program of capital 
financing for the Government of Alberta. I leave you now to the business of the 
Session, with full confidence that as elected representatives, your debates and 
your votes will reflect your understanding of the public interest of all people of 
Alberta (Alberta, 1983a, p.17). 
The government, through the Lieutenant Governor, is addressing “members of the 
legislative assembly” (and certainly many others), and drawing attention to the fact that 
these policies are at this stage only proposals, and must still be debated and voted upon.8  
                                                          
 
8 A recent public opinion survey titled GOA [Government of Alberta] Throne Speech and 
Budget Tracking offers insight into how the public consumes these speeches. Conducted 
by HarrisDecima, the survey examines how Albertans feel about budget proposals from 
the 2010 Budget, as well as the “awareness” respondents had of these priorities and 
agendas. 
(http://www.alberta.ca/albertacode/images/GOAThroneBudgetTrackingSummary.pdf). 
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The policy research tends to view agenda-setting as a stage of policy in which 
very few people (elected politicians and “those close to them”) are privileged to make 
important decisions regarding what issues enter the agenda, and how these issues are 
articulated. The tendency, then, is to focus on decision makers and to follow “their” 
agendas and policies through a sort of policy pipeline to examine how and if they reach 
fruition. The broader public tends to dissolve in the background, and policy (language) 
does not resonate back to the context from which it emerged. The focus is on the policy 
and process, and not necessarily the language of policy as part of that process. However, 
as the above discussion suggests, these agendas are also speeches (or perhaps become 
speeches), that are written, delivered, and consumed in particular ways by different 
groups in society, and by the broader public. In conceptualizing policy and government 
agendas as discourse I asked certain questions about their production, distribution and 
consumption. Although I am limited to examining only part of this interaction, the 
viewpoint which sees agendas as discourse and interactive, leads to queries regarding 
how policy issues (particularly the deficit) are understood in the broader perspective by 
the media, the political opposition, think tanks, and more generally the public. This 
viewpoint conceives of policy as both non-linear (inasmuch as it travels back to the 
context) and non-rational (inasmuch as policy decisions involve discursive and social 
practices). This is not a conceptualization of agenda-setting that I read anywhere, as I 
found both the policy studies theory, and the policy literature in the province to be 
lacking in this regard.  
In his discussion of EU employment policy, Muntigl (2002) asserts there are 
generally two classifications of policy, one is analytic and the other hortatory. He argues 
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that “analytical exposition refers to a genre that persuades an addressee to adopt a 
particular view of the world. Hortatory exposition, on the other hand, calls upon an 
addressee to act” (Muntigl, 2002, pp. 396-397). Although there are elements of both 
genres in government agendas, Muntigl’s brief discussion of analytic exposition (his 
focus is upon hortatory) resonates more fully with the policy type I have examined in this 
thesis. As analytic expositions, government pronouncements seek to persuade people that 
government policies, the associated issues and their proposed solutions, are the correct 
ones. Much of the discourse on government agendas deals with propositions about the 
way things are in the world, the nature of public problems, their solutions, and who or 
what is at fault. At stake is consensus and support for government and its policies. The 
government agendas I examine in this thesis are perhaps best understood by their 
orientation to the broader context, particularly different voices and policy articulations in 
the broader context. Fairclough (2003) argues that “difference is…central in 
‘monological’ texts, including written texts – most obviously because all texts are 
addressed, have particular addressees and readers in view, and assume and anticipate 
differences between ‘author’ and addressees” (p. 42). It is my finding that much of the 
language in government agendas seeks consensus by reducing different voices and policy 
articulations.  
Nominalization 
Asthana (2011), and Shore and Wright (1997) argue that analyzing policy as 
discourse draws attention to the ways in which the political nature of policymaking is 
concealed or hidden though the use of various linguistic elements. The potential for 
policy discourse to de-politicize policy processes represents perhaps the most salient 
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function of discourse, particularly in regards to articulation of policy proposals. This 
interest requires examining the form of policy language. Here, Fairclough’s (2003) 
discussion of nominalization seems particularly relevant. He argues:  
a linguistic form which is heavily used in accounts or narratives about the ‘global 
economy’ is nominalization…instead of representing processes which are taking 
place in the world as processes (grammatically, in clauses or sentences with 
verbs), they are represented as entities (grammatically, through nominalization, 
i.e. transforming a clause into a nominal or noun-like entity). One common 
consequence of nominalization is that the agents of processes, people who initiate 
processes or act upon other people or objects, are absent from texts (p.13). 
He further argues passive verbs, adjectives, and metaphors contribute to “a widespread 
elision of human agency in and responsibility for processes.”9 This is particularly true of 
neoliberal policies that aim to shift blame for complex social, political and economic 
issues, and ultimately, shift responsibility for public services from government to 
individual citizens and volunteer groups – a common occurrence in many Western 
democracies throughout the 1980s and 90s. I will pay attention to these aspects of policy 
form in my analysis, particularly as they pertain to the presence or absence of 
government as an agent of blame (or credit) in policy problems and solutions.  
My discussion of neoliberalism is limited, however. Although present on 
government agendas, I found examinations of neoliberal ideas and policies of more 
interest in areas where policy calls on addressees to act, to paraphrase Muntigl. 
Examinations of neoliberalism are perhaps more congruent in studies of policy 
implementation, where neoliberalism has been critiqued in areas of welfare restructuring. 
                                                          
 
9 In this statement Fairclough is referring specifically to the elision of human agency in 
accounts of what he refers to as the “new global economy,” where he argues that broad 
social changes come to appear as naturally occurring because of the manner in which 
they are linguistically represented.  
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Researchers highlight the problems associated with transposing the construction of a 
universalized market citizen on individuals, whose lived experiences and social 
circumstances often make it very difficult to “act” in the manner prescribed (Dacks, 
Green, and Trimble, 1995). Kingfisher (2013) details the nuances of translation and 
assemblage in her comparative analysis of this inconsistency of neoliberal policies in 
terms of how they are implemented and received in welfare policy. Neoliberal ideas and 
policies are present in all government agendas that I have examined, and the discursive 
issue of interest at this stage of policy lies in how these ideas represent complex social, 
political and economic processes, how they work to shift blame and perform identity 
work for government and Albertans, and particularly how they work to reduce different 
voices and policy articulations.  
Modality  
  Fairclough (1995) asserts that “modality refers to the extent to which producers 
commit themselves to, or distance themselves from propositions” (p. 142). There are a 
number of modal markers in speech that can be examined, including verbs (should, must, 
may), adverbs (definitely, probably, possibly), and tense (is, was, will be). Furthermore, 
propositions can be subjectively marked, in which case it is clear who is showing 
commitment to a given proposition. Objective modality refers to statements in which it is 
unclear who is making the statement or proposition. How governments articulate the 
nature of a given policy issue and its proposed solutions could have profound effects on 
how these articulations are contested or accepted. For example, contrast the two fictional 
statements regarding the cause of a deficit: 
1) “The deficit was caused by decreased revenues due to poor markets.” 
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2)  “I believe the deficit might have been caused by decreased revenues due to poor 
markets.”  
While both statements are assertions about the cause of the deficit, the first statement is 
much less open to contestation because it comes across as a neutral fact. In the second 
statement it is clear that the speaker’s opinion (I believe) is being expressed. The 
subjective marker (I), is much less a neutral fact, and more open to interpretation as an 
opinion. Moreover, the opinion is hedged by feel (rather than know) and might have been 
(rather than was), thus presenting a weaker commitment to the nature of the deficit.  
Fairclough (2003) argues that nominalizations often omit several of these modal markers 
that open up claims, assertions and beliefs to contestation.  
As mentioned above, the discursive practices at work in producing government 
agendas concerns issues of consensus in particular policy areas, and more generally, for 
government itself. The level of commitment (be it strong or weak), and the frequency and 
type of objective or subjective markers that governments display in their agendas 
regarding the way things are in the world, could have a profound impact on how those 
propositions are received and interpreted, contested, accepted, appropriated and/or re-
contextualized. This interest speaks to the potential ideological and political impacts of 
discourse – the extent to which propositions are inculcated, and the extent to which they 
work to construct and sustain (or change) social identities and relations of power, 
respectively.  
Summary  
My data consisted of government budgetary and speech from the throne texts. I 
have conducted a content analysis, which has been guided by an interest in government 
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priorities (particularly the issue of the deficit) and keyword searches. Moreover, 
discourse methods has informed my analysis, as I aimed to examine how public policy 
acts in and on the policy context from within which it emerged. I have found that these 
government documents contain propositions about the nature of complex social, 
economic and fiscal issues –propositions that call upon addressees to adopt a particular 
view regarding their causes and solutions, as well as embedded issues of identity and 
blame. Discourse analysis concepts of nominalization and modality have been useful 
language forms in this analysis. This approach facilitates a nuanced and complex 
examination of agenda-setting and the dynamics between actors, ideas, and institutions.  
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Chapter Three: The Context 
In this chapter I provide insight into political context for Alberta governments 
during the 1980s and 1900s through a review of the policy literature. I outline the 
province’s fiscal and economic performance, as well as the Conservative government’s 
waning support throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s until the time of Klein’s 
election in 1993. To borrow from Smith (1992), this was a context of increasing scarcity 
and conflict. There are a number of good studies of Alberta’s economy and politics 
during this period and this literature has been a useful guide in this regard. However, 
there is an absence of agenda-setting research that examines how governments navigate 
these difficult times. I will discuss the implications of this, and emphasize what agenda-
setting and discourse analysis research can contribute. I conclude this literature review by 
locating the unique place this thesis seeks in the literature.  
Years of Interest 
Regarding the province’s fiscal performance, Figure 3.1 below shows that the 
province recorded a deficit in the fiscal year 1982/83 (Lougheed), and then nine 
consecutive deficits from 1985/86 (Getty) to 1993/94 (the first full year of the Klein 
government) that began fourteen years of surpluses before ending in 2008. A review of 
the literature shows that several of the deficit years stand out as particularly difficult 
economically for the province. These years are 1982 and 1983 (Lougheed), 1986 and 
1992 (Getty) and 1993 (Klein). These years will be discussed in greater detail below. The 
decision to focus on these years is based upon the assertion within the policy sciences 
(and indeed discourse theory) of the importance of context to policy. 
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Figure 3.1 
Source: Department of Finance Canada 
I have made decisions regarding what years I thought most closely approximated 
the most recent policy climate of a challenging economy and deficit budgets (2008-
2014). My idea of the relevant context may be different than others writing in different 
circumstances. I should also note that the decision to focus on specific years is also 
partially rooted in an effort to make this project more manageable. A more in-depth and 
nuanced comparative examination of policy might result from increasing the scope of this 
project in terms of years of interest. As Brooks (1998) argues, public policy is influenced 
by what has been done in the past. Thus, examining government policy in surging and/or 
surplus years can (and does) provide a deeper understanding of government policy during 
the fiscally and economically challenging years. In recognition of this, and in accordance 
with a more fluid concept of context (one that does not open and close solely via 
economic or fiscal indicators), I have also examined both the existing literature on 
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government policy, as well as actual policy documents for some outlying years. Some of 
this information is also woven into the research and subsequent discussions.  
One final note before proceeding: the documents I have analyzed are for the year 
following each year of interest highlighted above. For example, although I have 
highlighted 1982 as a year of interest, I examined government documents from 1983. The 
purpose is to examine what policies the provincial governments pursued in response to, 
and in the wake of, the developments of the previous year. 
Agenda-Setting: From Consensus and Plenty to Scarcity and Conflict 
Peter Lougheed was elected Alberta’s first Conservative premier in August of 
1971, in what Richards and Pratt (1979) refer to as a stunning upset over the Social 
Credit government that had been in power since 1935. It was the first of four election 
victories for Lougheed, who enjoyed strong support at the polls throughout his years as 
premier.10 Smith (1992) paints the 1970s as a time of plenty for the Conservatives, and 
attributes Lougheed’s political success in the 1970s to both the booming economy and his 
often “spirited” battles with the federal government (and eastern Canadian capital) over 
provincial non-renewable resource development and wealth. Prosperity in the resource 
sector, along with changes to Alberta’s royalty structure, allowed the Lougheed 
government to increase per capita spending to among the highest in the country, to set 
aside as much as 30 percent of resource revenues to the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust 
                                                          
 
10  In 1971, Lougheed’s Conservatives took 46.6 percent of the vote and 49 of 75 seats; 
in 1975 they took 63 percent and 69 seats; in 1979 they took 57 percent, and 74 of 79 
seats (Smith, 1992; Richards and Pratt, 1979). In his final election in 1982, Lougheed 
took a healthy 63 percent of the vote and 75 of 79 seats; with the runner-up NDP party 
garnering 19 percent and two seats (Dyck, 1986).  
43 
 
Fund (AHSTF), and otherwise to assist large and small capital via subsidized loans and 
tax incentives, build infrastructure, and provide subsidies for new homeowners (Boothe, 
1995). The government argued that Alberta’s prosperity, its low taxes and high level 
government services stemmed from the “large sums of revenue flowing from the sale of 
non-renewable resources” (Alberta, 1976, p.5).  
However, Dyck (1986) argues that Alberta’s economy began to show signs of 
recession in late 1981, while Smith (1992) argues that the provincial bubble burst in 
1982, citing high interest rates, unemployment, falling oil prices and an economic 
recession throughout the Western world. Mansell and Percy (1990) seem to agree, 
arguing that provincial real GDP showed “persistence weakness” throughout the 1980s, 
beginning in 1982. They highlighted 1982 and 1983 and as particularly weak years. 
Amidst this economic slump the province held an election. Although Lougheed’s 
government took a rather comfortable 62 percent of the popular vote, Smith (1992) 
argues that Albertans witnessed in the 1980s “a transformation from the politics of plenty 
and consensus to the politics of scarcity and conflict” (p. 244). He later provides a 
concrete example of some of the conflict and scarcity that would increasingly become a 
feature of provincial politics throughout the 1980s in the following passage:  
[T]he election, however, marked a turning point in provincial economic policy. 
The government, stung by comments from large and small capital and from 
farmers that the public sector enjoyed a privileged position while they suffered, 
began to cut back the size of the public sector (p. 256). 
He argues elsewhere: “in a situation of declining revenues, the government was now 
having to make political choices as to who its friends were in deciding whether to 
allocate its scarce resources (p. 258). Thus the policy “context” is not just one of difficult 
economies and fiscal imbalance, but one more precisely of scarcity and conflict, not only 
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in terms of who gets what from government, but also in terms of approval for government 
and its policies. And, as successive Alberta governments continued to grapple with the 
politics of deficit, debt, and declining public support – it was a context of increasing 
scarcity and conflict. The policy context is also one in which discursive issues of 
consensus or approval seeking, involving identity management, and laying and deflecting 
blame increase in saliency for government.  
Kneebone (2006) argues that the economy stabilized somewhat in 1984 and 1985; 
an argument echoed by Dyck (1986) who cites increased drilling and production, and a 
number of new oil sands initiatives. Peter Lougheed resigned in late 1985 and Don Getty 
took over as premier. The following year Getty won the provincial election, taking 51.1 
percent of the popular vote and 61 seats, but the victory paled somewhat in comparison 
with Lougheed’s 62.2 percent and 75 seats garnered in the previous provincial election of 
1982. The Conservative stronghold over the province was slipping, if marginally, and 
Smith (1992) argues that the NDP’s 29 percent and 16 seats was the first sign of a 
competitive party system in the province in years.  
However, in 1986, just as Alberta appeared to be rebounding economically, two 
of the province’s biggest industries (wheat and oil) faced record price drops. Though the 
price for each stabilized somewhat the next year, Mansell and Percy (1990) argue the 
decline in these commodities dealt a “severe blow” to the province’s economic base and 
led to accusations the Getty government was not doing enough to lead Alberta through 
the harsh times (Nikiforuk, 1987). Facing decreased resource revenues, and increased 
public expenditures on health care, education and social services, the Getty Conservatives 
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were at first hesitant to reduce spending, hopeful that markets would turn around (Reid, 
2001).  
Many of Getty’s policy decisions were unpopular, and a number run-ins with the 
media during his tenure accentuated negative public feelings and raised fears about his 
government. He consequently came under harsh media and public criticism as someone 
who did not take his job seriously enough, did not work often enough and was not 
transparent enough (Savage-Hughes and Taras, 1992). Capturing this context of blame, 
Harrison (1995) argues the following:  
In the midst of the recession of 1985-86, the Getty government adopted the full 
range of fiscal measures available to them: raising taxes, cutting expenditures, and 
running a deficit. Albertans, still coming down from the heady 1970s, sought out 
someone to blame for the change in circumstances. And while, as in the past, 
much fell on the federal Liberals and central Canada, inevitably some of the 
blame also alighted on the provincial Tories and the new premier (p. 51).  
Indeed, Archer (1992) argues that by the late 1980s and early 1990s, many Conservative 
supporters in Alberta were becoming disenchanted. The 1989 provincial election results 
support this claim. While the NDP maintained their level of support from the 1986 
election,11 the Liberal party shot up from 12.2 percent and four seats to 28.6 percent and 
eight seats. Conservative support slipped from 51.1 percent and 61 seats to 44.4 percent 
and 59 seats.  
The early 1990s was a time of economic difficulty across the country – the result 
of a generalized recession and restructuring following the adoption of free trade after 
1988, in turn adversely affecting Alberta’s already precarious economy (Lisac, 2004). 
                                                          
 
11 The NDP party won 29 percent of the popular vote and 16 seats in 1986 compared to 
26.6 and 16 seats in 1989 (Smith, 1992). 
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Mansell (1997) argues that Alberta’s economy was in a recession in 1990-91 and 
describes it in late 1992 and early 1993 as still “fragile.” Tupper, Pratt and Urquhart 
(1992) argue that the economic and fiscal situation in the province insight into the 
political conflict the Getty Conservatives faced during this time – resulting from past and 
current efforts at diversification, and the province’s economic and fiscal situation. In 
September of 1992, amidst increasing public pressure and scrutiny, Premier Getty 
stepped down. Ralph Klein won the Conservative leadership campaign in December and 
was elected premier in June of 1993. Capturing the political climate prior to the election, 
Smith (1992) argues the Conservative government’s hold on power was tenuous, and that 
the election to come would be one of the most competitive in Alberta’s history. 
The issues of the deficit and mounting debt were particularly important for 
governments across the country in the late 1980s and early 1990s (as they had been for 
many governments throughout the Western world). Discussing the deficit at the national 
level, Lewis (2003) argues that Brian Mulroney’s Conservatives had “sworn off deficits” 
and committed to balanced budgets. He argues further that public opinion had shifted to 
the point that “electoral support and fiscal retrenchment were no longer incompatible” 
(p.159).  
In the Alberta election of 1993, both Liberal leader Laurence Decore and Ralph 
Klein pledged in their election campaigns to eliminate the provincial deficit without 
raising taxes, thus signalling the policy direction to come. Furthermore, Klein began 
referring to Alberta’s recurring deficits and mounting debt as a “crisis” to convince 
Albertans that the situation was critical (Cooper, 1996). Although the nature of Alberta’s 
“fiscal crisis” has been questioned by many, most notably Laxer and Harrison (1995), 
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Lisac (2004) argues that public opinion in Alberta was nonetheless in favour of both 
expenditure cuts and low taxes. This begs the question of how public opinion was 
produced in favour, and who was implicated in that production.  
Following the 1993 election, Klein’s government embarked on an aggressive 
strategy of deficit elimination and debt reduction. Facilitated by comprehensive cutbacks 
and retrenchment, and blessed by an economic turnaround, the Conservative government 
balanced the budget in 1994 and the province did not see another deficit until 2008. 
Although Klein’s government received significant criticism from the left during his first 
term, it was also praised by right-wing think tanks (such as the Fraser Institute), the 
business media (in Alberta and elsewhere), and perhaps most importantly, many 
Albertans. Indeed, despite the cutbacks Klein’s approval rating soared. Reshef and Rastin 
(2003) argue that Klein’s victory in 1997 was a strong indication of the public’s approval 
for his government’s activities beginning some four years earlier. They further point to 
the Conservative’s second landslide victory in 2001, and Klein’s ability to bring the 
Conservatives from near political extinction when first elected in 1993, as an indication 
that the people of Alberta supported many of Klein’s policies. The agenda-setting context 
faced by Getty changed significantly during the Klein years with balanced budgets, 
economic prosperity and strong voter support.   
Locating the Thesis  
I have referenced in the preceding discussion some of the research dealing with 
provincial policy during these years of interest. Much of this literature examines what 
governments did in the policy studies sense, and not in the discourse analysis sense I 
propose in this research. Indeed, Bruce et al. (1997), who provide a thorough examination 
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of Klein’s fiscal policies in his first years as premier, point out that much of the research 
(on Klein) has focussed on measuring policies and their outcomes. This is perhaps a good 
starting point for this section as it distinguishes my research from these studies during 
Klein’s years, as well as many of the studies of Alberta policy in the 1980s. Few 
researchers have taken a direct interest in what governments say as something they do, 
and even fewer studies involve an analysis of agenda-setting outputs. Moreover, and 
perhaps due to this, when researchers do acknowledge a role for language use in policy 
processes, there is no method to examine its potential influence.  
The research on Klein generally falls into two categories, those who support his 
policies and those who question them and offer alternatives. Taft (1997), Laxer and 
Harrison (1995) and the Parkland Institute are the most prominent critics of Klein’s 
policies. Bruce et al. (1997), Cooper (1996), and the Fraser Institute are perhaps the most 
prominent supporters of the changes that occurred during Klein’s first term. While these 
bodies of work offer different perspectives on Klein’s policies, both generally focus on 
the outcomes. Moreover, while my theoretical (and political) underpinnings align this 
thesis with those who question Klein, there seems to be a lack of attention to public 
opinion, agenda-setting, and issue salience in both streams of research. This is 
particularly the case with those who have supported Klein’s policies.  
For example, Bruce et al. (1997) have provided an examination of Klein’s Deficit 
Elimination Program. While a full review of their research is beyond the scope of this 
thesis (as well as beyond my expertise), I am curious about two questions posed in their 
introduction. On page three they ask “How did the Klein government gain and maintain 
the acceptance of voters for such dramatic spending cuts?” On page four they similarly 
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inquire how Klein’s government was able to convince people that the cutbacks were 
important. These questions, along with the analyses in several of the chapters that follow, 
contain assumptions about the nature of government, policy processes, and public 
opinion in Alberta. Indeed, they seem to take as a starting point that Albertans did not 
want cutbacks. However, as I have previously noted, Lisac (2004) argues that public 
opinion had shifted in favour of government cutbacks, while Lewis (2003) points to a 
similar occurrence at the national level. Indeed, several pages after these questions were 
posed in Bruce et al. (1997), Mansell later explains:  
In retrospect, as early as 1990 an astute political observer would have concluded 
that a majority of Albertans would support the type of aggressive action on 
deficits through expenditure cuts at the provincial level that the Reform Party was 
advocating at the federal level. Viewed in this light the election of the Ralph 
Klein government on such a platform should not have been surprising (p. 45).  
According to this, Klein’s ability to convince the population of the necessity of cutbacks 
had less to do with his government’s (and perhaps the media’s) ability to persuade, and 
more to do with being aware of the public sentiment. There is a lack of consistency in the 
volume regarding the nature of interaction between governments and citizens. Do 
governments convince people of an issue, or is it the other way around? Furthermore, the 
relationships seems to be one way, and are not complicated by different groups such as 
the media and political opposition.  
I suggest this inconsistency results from assumptions about how governments and 
citizens interact, and relatedly, a lack of attention to this interaction – how policy plays 
out at the level of agenda-setting and issue salience. The following passage offers some 
insight into the nature of interaction espoused by the research. In chapter four, Kneebone 
(1997) argues: 
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The source of this shift of preferences [for cutbacks] can likely be attributed to the 
rapid deterioration of Alberta’s public finances following the fall in energy prices 
in 1986. The speed with which Alberta’s net asset position turned into a large net 
debt position undoubtedly promoted a perception among voters of a fiscal crisis. 
If so, this perception may have been responsible for Albertans coming to the 
conclusion that the potential losses they might expect to suffer if the growth of the 
debt was left unchecked were large relative to the costs associated with cuts to 
provincial expenditures and/or increases in provincial taxes. Thus, as [some] 
suggest, a perception of a fiscal crisis may have been responsible for making 
substantial expenditure cuts and/or tax rate increases palatable.  
If this perception of a significant shift in Albertans’ preferences is correct, then an 
important part of the success of the fiscal changes initiated by the Alberta 
government was its ability to gauge and respond to this shift in popular sentiment 
(p. 160). 
There are assumptions about the “shift in Albertans” preferences as well as the issue of 
the deficit as a “crisis,” and that it was Klein’s government who was in tune with the 
voting public.  This seems inconsistent with the questions asked at the outset of the book. 
In speaking of a “shift in Albertans preferences” there is no attention to how this shift 
occurred. Rather, it appears that the “fiscal crisis” is what convinced people to shift their 
preferences to cutback public services. I have an issue with this assumption because I feel 
it overlooks the deficit as a focussing event, and the role of previous governments, the 
public, the media and opposition politicians to both articulate the issue of the deficit in 
particular ways and to interact within this context.  
 Turning to those who opposed Klein’s policies, Taft (1997) seems to take as a 
starting point that the Klein government convinced Albertans that massive cuts to 
expenditures was the only way forward for the province. While I am inclined after doing 
this research to agree with much of what he says, he tends to credit (blame) Klein’s 
government for many of the cutbacks, while overlooking that much of this work was in 
full motion before Klein came to office. As Mansell (1997) argues: “…it is useful to note 
that in the election of 1993, the Conservatives and Liberals both campaigned for ‘brutal’ 
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and ‘massive’ cuts, and together they obtained 84% of the vote” (p.45). Laurence Decore, 
the Liberal leader at the time, was beating the drum for expenditure cuts before Klein. 
What seems to be missing in this research is an examination how the issue of the deficit 
was articulated by the Getty government prior to Klein, as well as other important groups 
in the broader context, leading up to when Klein took over – an examination that actively 
captures public sentiment as it shifted, and influenced government decisions regarding 
the deficit as they occurred, not just at a point in time. Attention should be given to how 
self-interested opposition parties and media may have mobilized public sentiment, and 
focused public unrest on the deficit to discredit the government. What I propose to 
examine is not necessarily whether or not democracy was served, but how democracy 
“played out.” This can be done through agenda-setting and issue salience research.  
Ultimately much of this work is beyond the scope of this thesis. My more limited 
goal in this research is to examine the discourse on government agendas in the province 
during these periods. My primary assertion concerns a discursive priority of consensus 
seeking. This priority is never explicitly stated or acknowledged in any agenda, but I 
argue that government agendas interact with people and groups within the legislative 
assembly and the broader policy context to this end. Given the context of the struggling 
economy, and the deficit as a focussing event, these are potentially interesting times to 
examine the language practices used by governments. The Budgetary and Throne 
Speeches are documents that can be accessed to examine in a preliminary way how 
governments interact with the public.  
Change and Continuity: An Additional Policy (Discourse) Consideration 
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The topic of change and continuity is of special interest to both policy studies and 
discourse analysis, and consequently an important topic for this thesis. Howlett, Ramesh 
and Perl (2009) assert that understanding how policies form, change, and are maintained 
is a salient topic in policy studies, and add that continuity is a common feature of both 
policy and its processes.  
My research in this thesis also directs attention to the substance of policy, that is, 
policy outputs, at a very broad level of agenda setting. As previously discussed, one of 
the goals of agenda-setting research is to understand how and why agendas change (or do 
not change) over time. Kingdon (1995) points to political events and processes – 
including election results and changes in leadership or administration – as powerful 
influences on government agendas. The years of interest in this thesis occurred shortly 
after elections and/or changes in leadership. For example, the first year of interest is 
1982, the same year Lougheed was elected to his last term. Don Getty’s first year in 
office was 1986, while Klein took over after winning the Conservative leadership in 
1992, and was elected to office in 1993. As the analysis will show, changing government 
was an important theme in Klein’s 1993 agendas.  
Examining change and continuity is also an important issue for critical discourse 
analysts. Discussing policy change from a CDA perspective, Woodside-Jiron (2004) 
posits that important times for change occur when things are “going wrong.” Although 
she is vague on what it means to “go wrong,” I argue that the years of interest in this 
thesis – given the province’s economic, fiscal, and political circumstances – can be 
considered times when things were going wrong for many Albertans, as thousands of 
became unemployed, thousands more left the province, large business (particularly oil 
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and gas) and those in agriculture appealed to government for subsidies. Certainly, given 
the context of political conflict and scarcity, this was also a time when things went wrong 
for government. Woodside-Jiron asserts these times provide opportunities to: 
deconstruct the various aspects of practices that are oftentimes naturalized 
and therefore difficult to notice. These moments in time are particularly 
interesting to watch in terms of the language practices being used. They 
often shed light on language practices that naturalize relations of power 
and domination. Here, policy documents, documents that serve to redefine 
current thinking that have high circulation rates, and specific events where 
particular voices, ideas, or agendas are brought to the front and acted upon 
all become important sites for investigation” (p. 177).  
The analysis that follows will track priorities as they move on and off government 
agendas, as well as the language practices used by governments, in an extended period of 
things going increasingly wrong.  
Summary 
The years of interest for this thesis are 1983 and 1984 (Lougheed); 1987 and 1992 
(Getty); and 1993 (Klein). The agenda-setting context during this period was not only one 
of a struggling economy, fiscal imbalance and growing debt, but also, one of scarcity and 
conflict, and one in which embedded issues of blame, identity and consensus became 
increasingly important and problematic for government. How the issue of the deficit was 
(and is) articulated by government is particularly important to Albertans, for how the 
issue is articulated at this level holds implications not only for who gets what, but also, 
how policies are received and contested, accepted, appropriated, and re-contextualized 
within the broader context – for how democracy plays out in these periods.   
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Chapter Four: The Lougheed Government, 1983 and 1984 
 By 1983, the Lougheed government had been in office for twelve eventful years. 
The period began with the opening of the Syncrude tarsands plant in Fort McMurray, 
followed by the boom times. But by 1983 the province was in the throes of a bust that 
many blamed on the federal government’s National Energy Program, though the collapse 
of oil prices was a world-wide phenomenon. 
The boom and bust was not unanticipated by the Lougheed government. Looking 
back on the years leading up to Alberta’s fiscal issues in the early 1980s, one can see 
policies that anticipate the debates to come, including the setting up of the Heritage 
Savings Trust Fund in 1976, ongoing attempts at economic diversification, as well as 
“expenditure control” and “restraint” efforts. According to Mumey and Osternman 
(1990), the Heritage Fund was established to provide a future source of revenue for the 
province, aid economic diversification, and pay for capital projects. Discussing the 
Heritage Fund in the 1976 Budget Address, the Lougheed government argued: 
In recognition that the supply of non-renewable resources is limited and that 
revenue from the sale of those resources ultimately will decline, the Heritage 
Fund was established by an act of the Legislature of Alberta on May 19, 1976 
(Alberta, 1976, p.5). 
The government also stated in the 1976 Budget Address that “[I]t is our judgment though 
that the time has now come to substantially restrain the rate of increase of provincial 
government spending” (Ibid). The 1977 Budget Address similarly touched upon the 
government’s commitment to “continue a general attitude of restraint in the growth of 
provincial government spending” and “fiscal responsibility” to maintain the province’s 
“strong financial position during the transition from a resource-based economy to a more 
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permanent self-sustaining diversified structure” (Alberta, 1977, p.5). The government 
argued further that: 
The major source of Alberta’s past rapid growth – our conventional crude oil and 
natural gas – is depleting. As this process occurs we will experience an inevitable 
shift in government revenues, toward those sources, such as personal and 
corporate income taxes, which future Albertans will be called upon to provide. 
(Ibid).  
Similar priorities were again highlighted in 1978. The government prepared during the 
mid and late 1970s for a time when it believed non-renewable resource revenues would 
taper off and form a lower portion of provincial revenues. It planned to smooth this 
“transition period” through Heritage Fund savings and investment, increases in personal 
and corporate taxes, a more “diversified” economy, and expenditure reductions.   
In 1981 the government warned that expenditures were beginning to outstrip 
revenue growth, and asserted the province was approaching an “important decision point” 
regarding raising taxes, reducing savings, and lowering demands for expanding services 
(Alberta, 1981, p.205). In 1982’s Budget Address Lougheed’s government asserted the 
province was transitioning from an economy dependent on depleting natural resources to 
one that relied on more “traditional” revenue sources (Alberta, 1982, p.23). They argued 
further that if demands for provincial services continued to rise, they would “increase tax 
rates sooner than expected,” and that “tax increases will inevitably have to occur” (Ibid, 
p.28). 
As earlier mentioned, the late 1970s early 1980s also witnessed significant tension 
between the provincial and federal governments. Indeed, Lougheed’s government singled 
out The National Energy Program (NEP) and the patriation of the constitution in 1981 as 
two “very substantial difficulties” that posed a “threat” to Alberta’s future (Alberta, 1981, 
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p.7). The government reserved a particular disdain for the NEP, calling it a 
“discriminatory federal taxation” that had shaken Alberta’s economic growth (ibid).12 
Ultimately, the government felt the constitutional reforms and NEP infringed on areas of 
provincial jurisdiction. 
Amidst a climate of growing political and economic uncertainty, albeit 
uncertainties anticipated in the years prior, Peter Lougheed’s Conservatives were re-
elected on November 2, 1982. Lougheed’s final term as premier – he stepped down two 
years later – is of interest to this thesis, as the province experienced an economic 
slowdown and a budgetary deficit. What were government priorities in these years, and 
where did the issue of the deficit lie on the agenda? What issues or problems were 
(argued to be) at the heart of these priorities? Who – or what – was viewed as 
responsible? And what solutions did the government offer? Lastly, what were the 
language features used in these priority articulations? To answer these questions this 
thesis turns to the 1983 and 1984 Budget and Throne Speeches. 
Government Agenda 1983 
The government outlined three priorities in the 1983 Speech from the Throne, and 
a four point “fiscal strategy” in the Budget Address.  
1983 Throne: Priorities 1983 Budget: Fiscal Strategy 
  
Economic resurgence Sound financial management 
Job training and retraining Economic recovery 
Sound financial management Maintain health, education and social services 
                                                          
 
12 Dyck (1986) argues that the NEP led to a decline in oil exploration in the province, 
halted oils sands projects, and fuelled separatism, as a number of right-wing separatist 
parties were soon active on the Alberta scene. The latter is certainly correct; the 
economic impacts of the NEP remain somewhat contentious, however. 
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 Reduce the public service 
 
Economic recovery/resurgence and sound financial management both came up in the 
Throne and Budget Addresses, placing broad policy areas of the economy and fiscal 
matters at the forefront of government priorities. Other priorities, such as job training 
(Throne) and reducing the public sector (Budget) also spoke to economic and fiscal 
concerns. Rounding out government priorities for 1983 were public services (health, 
education and social services), highlighted in the budget. The economy, fiscal matters 
and public services were broad priority areas in 1983.  
Keyword searches yielded hits for “new budgetary,” “new fiscal” or “new 
economic reality(ies).” For example, the government argued that the “transition from an 
overheated economy to one of more measured, sustained growth involves new budget 
realities for Albertans” (Alberta, 1983b, p. 289). These keywords served as markers, or 
justifications of potentially unpopular government policy decisions. Word searches 
yielded more hits for these terms in the Budget Address than the Speech from the Throne. 
Speech from the Throne 
The government offered little discussion of the deficit in the Speech from the 
Throne. However, the priority of “sound financial management,” coupled with the two 
other agenda priorities that were to be carried out “within the limits of financial 
constraints,” is an indication that provincial finances were a government priority in 1983. 
Lougheed’s government argued it would improve both the quality and scope of social 
services “while simplifying policies and procedures in light of the economy and cost 
effectiveness” (Alberta, 1983a, p. 7). Regarding “sound financial management,” the goal 
was “restraining the rate of growth of government expenditure” (p. 16).  
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Despite the goal to restrain growth, the government allocated significant funding 
to buoy the private sector. The Alberta Economic Resurgence Plan, released in the fall of 
1982, consisted of a “large stimulative capital budget” (p. 2). The priority of economic 
resurgence in 1983 was to see the government “sustain” and “supplement” this plan 
through “intensive efforts to assist the private sector.” The government argued the 
following of the economic resurgence plan:  
My government responded to this economic situation in 1982 by bringing forth a 
large simulative capital budget to help sustain activity, by reducing oil and gas 
royalties to encourage job activity in the petroleum industry, by shielding home 
owners from high interest rates to stabilize consumer and retail trade, by reducing 
interest expense to our farmers to partially offset decline in net farm income, and 
by shielding small businesses from high interest rates to sustain these 
businessmen through this difficult period (p. 2). 
Of interest here is the use of active wording such as responded, bringing forth, 
stimulative, reducing, sustain, encourage and shielding. Indeed, the priority of “economic 
resurgence” creates an image of activity, presumably directed at the above groups, which 
includes homeowners, businessmen, petroleum industry, and farmers. These policy 
articulations ultimately aim to construct an identity for government that is actively 
addressing policy issues.  
This active wording was not limited to economic issues, however, and keyword 
searches for “my government” (the first words of the above passage) produced 38 hits. 
Most instances were followed by an action statement such as “my government will 
assist…” and “my government has been actively engaged…” This active wording, along 
with a strong commitment to what government had done, was doing, or would do, are 
categorical assertions about government, their policies, and their relation with various 
people in the province. A presence of modal markers regarding, for example, what 
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government may have done, might do in the future, or was trying to do, would result in 
less assertive statements and open up these articulations to difference of opinion or 
criticism. Moreover, this active “responding,” “helpful” and “shielding” language 
potentially leads to assumptions about the source and nature of policy issues as 
something external to the province, and a threat. Inasmuch as government was viewed as 
universally active and helpful, this language acts as a moral guide that seeks to suppress 
blame, criticism and difference – indeed it would seem ungrateful to criticize such a 
helpful and protective government.  
This language is a thematic constant in all Speech from the Throne agendas I 
examined, and speaks to issues of identity, and more generally, the discursive practice of 
consensus seeking embedded in government priorities and agendas. It is not my argument 
that governments necessarily knowingly fashion policy agendas in this manner, nor do I 
argue that agendas are necessarily interpreted in this manner (certainly, the interpretation 
can depend upon a number of factors beyond the articulation). Rather, I wish to draw 
attention to the features of language embedded in policy agendas, and theorize about their 
discursive nature. Examinations of this nature are not present in the provincial literature, 
nor are they encouraged by much of the policy theory that promote rational and linear 
examinations of policy.  
Budget Address 
Social programs, fiscal policy and the economy were budgetary priorities in 1983, 
evidenced by the government’s four-fold “fiscal strategy,” which involved: sound 
financial management; economic recovery; maintenance of education, health and social 
service programs; and a reduction in the size of the public service (Alberta, 1983b, p. 
290). Of these four objectives, “sound financial management” was particularly salient, as 
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the government argued the Budget’s “central objective” was to “safeguard” provincial 
finances and thereby “preserve Alberta’s fiscal credibility” (Ibid).  
Sound financial management. The government described the budget as a 
“prudent,” “responsible,” and “restrained approach” that would see a dramatic reduction 
in the growth of government costs and the size of the public sector,13 and no major tax 
increases (p. 286). Due to “new budget realities,” a key thrust of the 1983 budget was a 
“hold-the-line approach” that would see “very few new programs and enrichments” (p. 
290). Lougheed’s government asserted the slumping economy, coupled with the 
“demands of a fast-growing population,” had led to a number of fiscal concerns, 
including 1982’s “record deficit,” depleting financial reserves, and borrowing for the first 
time in 10 years (p. 296).  
The government proposed revenue increases via Heritage Fund transfers and 
increases to health care premiums and the tobacco tax to address fiscal concerns. 
Revenues, particularly non-renewable resource revenues, were described as 
“unpredictable,” “volatile,” and “erratic.” The causes of the economic downturn were all 
external to the province, as Alberta was “simultaneously hit by the full aftershock of the 
Ottawa energy program, record high interest rates, a Canadian and world recession, 
falling energy demand, and softening oil prices” (p. 287).14 The solutions sought 
                                                          
 
13 The fourth objective in the fiscal strategy involved reducing the public service by a 
total of 237 positions. 
 
14 The government took issue with federal policies in particular, and argued that the NEP 
“inflicted” upon the country was an “ill-conceived,” “harmful” and “anti-investment” 
initiative that weakened Canada’s energy industry (Ibid). 
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contained similar active wording to that of the Speech from the Throne. The government 
emphasized numerous times that oil and gas revenue sources were beyond their control: 
Roughly one-half of revenue is directly tied to the production and sale of our non-
renewable resources. As was so graphically evidenced in 1982, market conditions 
largely beyond our control can cause unpredictable changes in our revenue. While 
we are closer to receiving fair market value for our resources, our revenue 
situation is more volatile than ever before. Fiscal planning and forecasting is 
therefore more difficult (Alberta, 1983b, p. 289). 
The assertions of interest in this passage deal with the composition of provincial 
revenues, the unpredictability of non-renewable resource revenues, and the concluding 
principal assertion that fiscal planning and forecasting is difficult. These are strong 
assertions, evidenced by the tense marker is, instead of a weaker alternative such as might 
be or could be. 15 This strong modality is bolstered by wording “tied directly” and “more 
volatile.” Inasmuch as revenues are “largely beyond” control and “unpredictable,” this 
language use has the potential to minimize government accountability for the deficit, or 
poor fiscal planning. Recall that economic diversification, with the aim of decreasing 
dependency upon these volatile sources, was an ongoing priority for Lougheed’s 
government throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. Issues of responsibility and blame for 
poor “fiscal planning” and failed economic diversification efforts are at stake in these 
assertions. So too is consensus for government and its policies.  
                                                          
 
15 There are, however, markers of a weaker modality, represented by “market conditions 
largely beyond our control can cause unpredictable changes.” This statement is less 
absolute than others in the passage, and suggests that government has some degree of 
control in fiscal planning. A categorical assertion such as “market conditions beyond 
control cause…” would go farther in removing Lougheed’s government as an agent of 
responsibility in revenue planning.   
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Other revenue sources. It is true that not all revenues are “largely beyond 
control.” Here, provincial taxation is of interest. The government pointed to their tax 
policy – no personal or corporate tax increases, and no sales or gasoline tax – as one of 
the “major reasons revenue has not kept pace with expenditures” (p. 289). However, the 
government did propose to increase the tobacco tax and health care premiums: 
Given the new budget realities faced by Alberta, the unavoidable option of 
increasing tax revenue to reduce the size of the deficit was carefully weighed 
(Alberta, 1983b, p. 294).  
The framing of tax increases as an “unavoidable option,” suggests that government does 
not wish to raise taxes, and offers insight into the broader context where raising taxes 
may be an unpopular decision (with some but perhaps not all). Moreover, inasmuch as 
this option was “unavoidable” it was not a decision or option at all, thus removing the 
government as a potential agent of blame in tax increases. The option was nonetheless 
“carefully weighed,” where carefully weighed is viewed as a reassurance that things are 
not being done in haste. After tabling tax increase proposals, the government asserted that 
“Albertans still enjoy, by a wide margin, the lowest tax rates in the country” (p. 294). 
The manner in which the government discussed taxes leads to questions 
concerning what “Albertans” desire or “enjoy” in a taxing scheme. These are value 
statements regarding the undesirability of tax increases, and the desirability of the lowest 
taxes in the country. However, the government does not reference, for example, a public 
opinion poll. It is consequently unclear if this is a reflection of what “Albertans” desire – 
to what extent Lougheed’s government was responding to active, perceived or anticipated 
criticism or expectations – or if this taxing scheme is more precisely a government desire 
that has also been framed as an “Albertan” desire. An important issue in these excerpts is 
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the potential (re)construction of an “Alberta” identity, or a portion thereof, that involves 
low taxes (among the lowest in the country), and how this identity might influence 
agenda setting processes regarding what can and cannot be done regarding taxation. This 
interest resonates with Fairclough’s ideological function of language, and complicates 
issues of government agency and power with regards to tax policy.  
A further point of interest lies in tax increases “to reduce the size of the deficit.” 
Why did the government not justify tax increases to reduce the deficit and pay for 
provincial services, or economic initiatives – two priorities representing large financial 
commitments? Here the deficit emerged as an issue in itself, and questions arise 
regarding how “the deficit” was understood and articulated in the broader context, and 
what kind of attention it was receiving.   
Keyword searches for “reality(ies)” produced 13 hits for the 1983 budget, far 
more than the other years of interest for this thesis. Most instances of “new reality” 
(budgetary, fiscal or economic) occurred as justification for a potentially unpopular 
policy, as seen in the above passage where the government proposed tax increases. In 
discussions of many other “new realities,” the government proposed service or funding 
cuts. The term “reality” is particularly interesting in policy issues due to its potential to 
naturalize the issue at hand, and thus remove decisions and agents (of blame or 
responsibility) from policy processes.  
Maintenance of Social Programs and Economic Recovery. The fiscal strategy 
contained the priorities of maintaining provincial social programs and economic 
recovery. These policy areas represent important expenditure aspects of the budget, and 
perhaps stand in contrast to government efforts to “restrain expenditure growth.” Indeed, 
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the government asserted their spending restraint would be balanced by their 
“commitment to continue to provide among the best public services in Canada and to care 
about those Albertans who require special assistance” (p. 286). They argued elsewhere 
that Alberta’s “wide range of programs” was of “unparalleled quality” and “second to 
none,” and cited as proof the province’s high per capita expenditure rate compared to the 
rest of the country (p. 292). The following passage displays less commitment to social 
programs, however:  
Therefore the government and Alberta's citizens will be obliged to respond to 
these new circumstances with more realistic expectations as to the capacity of the 
provincial government to continue to provide high-cost services without major tax 
increases (Alberta, 1983b, p. 294). 
There is an inclusion element in this passage (evidenced by “the government and 
Alberta’s citizens...”) that weds government and “Albertans” in the preference for cutting 
back public services over tax increases. Is this preference representative of “Alberta’s 
citizens”? To what extent is government speaking for Albertans, and constructing what 
Albertans desire in a tax scheme? This is a potentially significant moment in provincial 
policy, as it represents a turnaround from the open discussions regarding major tax 
increases (personal and corporate taxes) from previous budgets throughout the late 1970s. 
As recently as 1982 the government asserted that if demands for provincial services 
continued to rise, they would “increase tax rates sooner than expected” (Alberta, 1982, 
p.28). How or why this change came about is unclear in the Budget Speech, as there is no 
discussion of any sort of deliberative process. Moreover, there is no clarification of this in 
the literature.  
Government Agenda 1984 
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The government highlighted the following five priorities in 1984’s Speech from 
the Throne, and a five-fold fiscal strategy in the Budget Address:  
1984 Throne: Priorities  1984 Budget: Fiscal Strategy16 
  
Fiscal policy directions Fiscal responsibility 
Basic education reforms Public service restraint 
Deregulation Reduce the size of government 
Expanded privatization Sustain employment 
Legislative proposals Maintain “high level” people services 
 
The “major challenge” for 1984 was to “steer a careful course between sound financial 
management, providing job-producing private sector initiatives, while maintaining  at the 
same time our high level public services” (Alberta, 1984a, p. 16). The budget’s fiscal 
strategy also contained economic, fiscal and social priorities. However, throne priorities 
focussed on fiscal and economic issues, while the budget’s “dual goal” was to balance 
fiscal responsibility with an economic climate conducive to private sector growth 
(Alberta, 1984a, p. 2). Keyword searches for the year saw “transition” (six) and 
“adjustment” (nine) emerge as important themes in the budget. The Speech from the 
Throne yielded no matches for either of these words.  
Speech from the Throne 
The deficit was not addressed in the Speech from the Throne, though fiscal policy 
was to “stress a trimmer, leaner government” and “responsible management of the public 
finances” (Alberta, 1984a, p. 15). There was also a “government-wide” deregulation 
                                                          
 
16 The Budget Address also contained “budgetary objectives” of economic recovery, 
fiscal responsibility, reductions in manpower and expenditure, employment support and 
maintenance of people services.  
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effort, which centred on reducing or eliminating “unnecessary or obsolete regulations” 
that “frustrate or complicate” business and citizens (p. 2).  
The government was also looking to privatize services in 1984, and argued that a 
number of departments had utilized or were looking to utilize private sector staffing in 
light of recent privatization initiatives (p. 15).17 In the transportation industry, for 
example, services were outsourced to the private sector. Additionally, discussion of social 
services saw government “continue to encourage the involvement of volunteers and the 
private sector” (p. 6). This encouragement is significant as it is evidence of government 
seeking to decrease social responsibility and transfer it to the civil (volunteer) and private 
sectors. The specific priorities of deregulation and privatization represent a more 
focussed set of neo-liberal economic principles aimed at restructuring government than in 
1983.  
Budget Address 
 The government described 1983 as the “most difficult economic year in more 
than a decade” (Alberta, 1984b, p. 176). The outlook for 1984-85, however, was 
optimistic as it asserted the “the worst is behind us” (Ibid). The government argued that 
“Alberta is in transition from a period of superheated, artificially high growth to one of 
more normal and sustainable growth”; the “adjustment process” was largely completed 
(p. 177). 
Fiscal responsibility and public service restraint. The reported deficit for 1982-
83 was $2 billion, while the forecast for 1983-84 called for a deficit of $560 million (p. 
                                                          
 
17 Specifically, the privatization of Pacific Western Airlines.  
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180). The deficit was described as a “major problem,” while the prospect of long term 
deficits was “very disturbing” (p. 177). The government attributed the deficit to drastic 
increases in world oil prices in 1979 (which created an influx of investment, people and 
expenditures), the national energy program, and softened world oil markets. 
Consequently, Alberta was left with high “expenditure commitments and uncertain 
revenue prospects” (p. 180). The government proposed a two- fold “deficit reduction 
strategy” of transfers from the Heritage Fund, expenditure reductions and the elimination 
of over 800 fulltime public sector positions. 
The Heritage Fund was particularly important to fiscal goals in 1984, as the 
government announced “continued use of the Heritage Fund to hold down taxes and 
reduce the deficit” (p. 185). The fund was the province’s “financial bridge to the future.” 
Of particular interest here is the goal to “hold down taxes,” which again, is a turnaround 
from the 1970s when Lougheed’s government openly discussed raising taxes (personal 
and corporate) as part of this “bridging” and transition period. Regarding taxation, 
Lougheed’s 1984 government argued the following:  
There are no new taxes and there are no increases in existing tax rates in this 
budget. [Applause]  
Albertans enjoy the most favourable overall tax environment in Canada. We 
continue to have the lowest personal income tax rate of any province, we are one 
of only two provinces with no gasoline tax, and we are the only province with no 
sales tax (p. 184). 
DR. BUCK: We better not bring one in.18 
                                                          
 
18 It was at this point, as discussed earlier (p.37), that MLA Dr. Walter Buck interjected, 
as noted in Hansard.  
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To conclude this taxation discussion the government argued that “if energy prices or 
markets deteriorate, or if expenditure on services cannot be contained, there will be no 
alternative but to look at a combination of service level cuts and tax increases” (Ibid). But 
discussions for tax increases or the need for a provincial sales tax were rare, and language 
such as the province’s “favourable” tax environment relative to the rest of the country, 
phrasing of “no alternative” regarding increases, and the above argument regarding the 
Heritage Fund “hold(ing)” down taxes suggests that tax increases were undesirable in the 
province at the time. Indeed, this passage offers a rare view into the broader policy 
context in which a member of an opposing party, and apparently the rest of the 
legislature, displayed opposition to tax increases. Moreover, “Albertans” are constructed 
in this passage as “enjoy(ing)” the lowest taxes in Canada. Given the rarity of applauses 
and interjections (I do not recall any others in my analysis), I suggest the issue of taxation 
was actively debated at the time. However, this speech offers little information regarding 
how important groups including the voting public, business, and media understood the 
issue at the time. 
Expenditures. The government argued the budget lowered expenditure growth by 
1.7 percent (p. 180-81).19 The government called for Albertans to be “partners in 
restraint” by lowering their demands for public services (p. 180). The manner in which 
government discussed cutbacks is of interest: 
In 1983 we began to tackle government expenditure growth with a hold-the-line 
budget. This budget stays the course. It marks the second step in a necessary and 
orderly paring down of the provincial government sector (p. 176). 
                                                          
 
19 They pointed out that they lowered expenditure growth from 30 percent to about 10 
percent in 1983. 
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Phrasing such as “tackle,” “hold-the-line,” “stays the course,” and “paring down” imply 
that cutbacks were difficult or uncomfortable for government, or that government wished 
them to appear this way. Indeed, the act of tackling produces an image of something that 
is out of control and must be taken down. The assertion that paring down was 
“necessary” contains a strong commitment to a need for cutbacks, and has the potential to 
hide the decision, and thus the agent – potentially deflecting criticism or blame for 
cutbacks.  
After tabling restraint proposals, the following discussion aimed to soften any 
potential blow (or perhaps silence an active critique): 
Even with this level of belt-tightening, Albertans will still enjoy the finest level of 
services and facilities of any province. On a per citizen basis, Alberta's 
expenditure on government services is approximately 35 percent above the 
average for all provinces (p. 181).  
Again, the metaphor of belt-tightening suggests that cutbacks were unpleasant. Reaction 
to the decision to restrain and cutback (presumably unpopular with the voting public, but 
also perhaps the media, bureaucrats and those within government departments who are 
receiving cutbacks) is potentially softened through an appeal to Alberta’s still strong 
monetary support for public services relative to the rest of the country. Here, government 
services are used as leverage for consensus in proposals for cutbacks. Elsewhere in the 
Budget Address, the government asked Albertans to “expect less,” and asserted the 
“support of all Albertans is needed because demand for services fuels and increases in 
our operating costs” (p. 181). These latter examples are direct appeals for co-operation, 
and indicative of a need or desire for consensus in policy proposals.  
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Economic Recovery. The fiscal strategy for the year was intended to “sustain 
employment and set the foundation for a period of steady, durable private sector growth 
and job security” (p. 180).20 They proposed the following economic initiatives:  
This year the government will continue to support vigorously marketing and trade 
development for Alberta's products. The international market is fiercely 
competitive. No existing Alberta market, whether domestic or foreign, is safe. 
New sales will require aggressive, imaginative initiatives. Now is the time to 
support our international sales force. The government will work in partnership 
with Alberta industry to help expand our markets (p. 181). 
This passage contains strong propositions, evidenced by strong tense markers (is, will), 
which lead to categorical assertions about nature of government and the international 
economy. For example, “the government will continue to support vigorously” and “the 
government will work in partnership.” These assertions about the nature of government 
(as helpful, supportive, aggressive, imaginative and partners) are juxtaposed to 
categorical assertions about the nature of the international economy, which is fiercely 
competitive and a threat (no market is safe) to Alberta markets. The language is 
metaphoric, and it gives “international markets” qualities such as “fiercely competitive.” 
Markets appear to be attacking Alberta business, and thus receive the blame for 
provincial economic issues. In contrast, the government is constructed as universally 
willing and helpful, active, and indeed, an ally to Alberta business.  
Summary  
Government priorities in 1983 and 1984 spoke to economic and fiscal issues, and 
to a lesser extent social programs. While the deficit appeared as an issue on both the 
                                                          
 
20 The fiscal priorities discussed above are understood, at least partially, as economic 
tools. 
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Throne and Budgetary Agendas in 1983, it did not receive significant attention in either. 
Rather, the more salient fiscal issue was “restraining” expenditure growth, despite 
outlining significant spending commitments to buoy the economy. There is evidence of 
the deficit increasing in saliency in 1984, as the government labelled the prospect of 
recurring deficits “very disturbing.” 
In some instances there was a clear effort consensus seeking, as the government 
explicitly asked Albertans for “cooperation,” or to expect or demand less. In other 
instances, government used as leverage for consensus Alberta’s “advantages” to the rest 
of Canada, including its high level social programs, tax policy and more generally its 
fiscal and economic performance. Most often, however, government used language that 
presented itself as not to blame, as helpful, efficient, supportive, protective, etc. 
Overwhelmingly, these were categorical statements, and were realized through an 
absence of subjective markers that could indicate an expression of opinion, and of soft 
modal markers regarding what the government had done, was doing, or would soon do. 
Also, government was framed in a moral (helpful, protective, efficient) language that 
supresses critique and offers little room for different voices regarding policy articulations. 
Of interest is the power or ability of government officials to construct government and 
Albertans in particular ways, and relatedly, the power of language and ideas to remove 
government as an agent of blame in policy issues, and at times to remove decisions, or 
perhaps disguise government decisions as those of Albertans (as was the case with 
taxation in 1983).   
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Chapter Five: The Getty Government 1987 
After fourteen years in office, Peter Lougheed resigned as premier. Don Getty, a 
colleague and prominent member of the cabinet took over as Conservative leader and 
premier in November 1985 amidst ongoing concerns about the province’s economic 
prospects for 1986. The government’s priorities reflected this uncertainty, and efforts to 
assist oil and gas, as well as agriculture appeared in the Speech from the Throne. 
Budgetary priorities, included “reaching” out to Albertans who were less fortunate; 
continuing quality people programs; further streamlining government; and maintaining a 
“success-oriented, low tax environment” (Alberta, 1986, p. 25). The government planned 
to continue both the “momentum of privatization,” and to downsize the public sector by 
laying-off another 300 workers. 
While there is carry-over from Lougheed’s agendas regarding the broad priority 
areas of the economy,21 fiscal policy and social programs, Getty’s agenda differs in terms 
of a stronger emphasis on social programs, and particularly the priority of “reaching out” 
to those Albertans who were “less fortunate.” Getty’s attention to this policy group – 
consisting of the elderly, children, disabled persons, unemployed, and others – is of note. 
This concern for social programs is seen in 1987’s agendas as well.  
Government Agenda 1987 
The government opened both the Throne and Budget Speeches with discussion of 
the economy, fiscal policy and public programs. In the Speech from the Throne, for 
                                                          
 
21 See Smith (1992), Dyck (1986), and Tupper, Pratt, Urquhart (1992) for more detailed 
accountings of economic continuity and change (particularly regarding economic 
diversification) between the two premiers.  
73 
 
example, government discussed the “sudden” drop in oil prices, a large budgetary deficit 
and balancing the budget, and maintaining Alberta’s “leading programs in health care, 
services for seniors, education and social policy” (Alberta, 1987a, p.1). In the Budget 
Address the government similarly discussed “extreme and difficult” economic challenges, 
“tough measures to address the new fiscal challenges facing Alberta,” and their 
commitment to “protect those Albertans in need” and “quality services” (Alberta, 1987b, 
p.1). However, there was a strong focus on the economy in throne priorities, while 
budgetary priorities focussed exclusively on the deficit – evidenced by the two-point 
fiscal strategy to lower the deficit in the short-term, and balance the budget in the 
medium-term by 1990-91. Keyword searches in the Speech from the Throne yielded 
increased hits for the active wording previously discussed, but did not produce any 
dominant theme in either document.    
1987 Throne: Priorities 1987 Budget: Fiscal Strategy 
  
Employment  Deficit reduction 
Education Balance the budget by 1990-91 
Agriculture  
Energy   
Economic diversification  
 
Speech from the Throne 
Although not outlined as a priority, the deficit was a significant concern in 1987. The 
government offered the following discussion in the opening of its address:  
A budgetary deficit can be justified in the short term to protect Albertans, but as 
in our homes and businesses, deficits cannot be allowed to continue. My 
government will outline plans in the budget to balance the province's finances in 
an orderly way over the next several years. In this process Alberta's leading 
programs in health care, services for seniors, education, and social policy will not 
be placed at risk. Alberta has a long tradition of prudent financial management, 
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and working together, Albertans will continue to benefit from my government's 
firm commitment to these important policy areas.  
My government encourages all Albertans to join in a cooperative spirit to meet 
the challenge of our new fiscal realities.  
At the same time, these new realities can bring out the best in Albertans as 
together we seek new answers and new innovations to assure the greatness we 
know Alberta can achieve (p. 1). 
The strong propositions (realized primarily through the wording “my government 
will…”) similar to those used by Lougheed’s government in 1983 and 1984, stand out 
here. This language indicates identity work is at play, where “firm commitment” (to 
social programs), and “deficits cannot be allowed to continue” speaks to the identity of a 
government of action and firmness. These identities relate to the priorities of social and 
fiscal policy (both appear in the first line when the deficit is justified to provide social 
programs).  
There are potentially two audiences holding different priorities in this passage, 
one that values a “prudent financial manager” in government and one that values a 
commitment to social programs. While the latter group is more clearly identifiable as 
“Albertans,” there is less clarity on what group(s) value fiscal responsibility, or indeed, to 
what extent “Albertans” also value fiscal responsibility from government. Of particular 
interest is the potential conflict between these priority areas and identities, and perhaps 
the primary discursive work at play in this passage, which is to bring harmony to this 
potential conflict. It is here where this passage appears to be addressing “Albertans” more 
than specific groups seeking “fiscal responsibility.” In the last sentence of the first 
paragraph, for example, the government appears to set out a condition of cooperation for 
Albertans: 
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Alberta has a long tradition of prudent financial management, and working 
together, Albertans will continue to benefit from my government's firm 
commitment to these important policy areas. 
 
The assumption of “working together” potentially closes off or minimizes the choice or 
possibility of not “working together,” as Fairclough (2006) argues, assumed consensus 
supresses actual difference. A direct appeal for consensus is present in the second when 
the government “encourages” a “cooperative spirit” from Albertans. In the third 
paragraph the government again assumes cooperation (consensus) as they argue “as 
together we seek new answers…” Of interest in the last line is the document has gone 
from potential conflict and consensus seeking between government and Albertans, to an 
actual consensus where Albertans are constructed as working with government.  
Further driving towards consensus is the manner in which government sets up 
cooperating as a moral good, where cooperating will “bring out the best” and “assure 
greatness” in Albertans, in which case it would not seem logical to not cooperate. 
Moreover, inasmuch as social programs are represented as contingent upon working 
together, not working together represents a potential threat to their continuance. 
There is evidence of increased saliency regarding identity management for 
Getty’s government in 1987. For example, word searches for “my government…” 
increased from 38 and 32 in 1983 and 1984 to 60 hits in 1987.22 This increase was also a 
jump from 46 hits in 1986 (Premier Getty’s first Speech from the Throne). Although it is 
unclear why this increase took place, if it was merely coincidence for example, it is 
                                                          
 
22 The active wording similar to that of Lougheed is present in all policy areas. Examples 
include priorities of agriculture and energy, which were designed to “protect Albertans” 
from economic challenges, and the priority of economic diversification, which the 
government planned to “vigorously promote and continue” (p. 1) 
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possible Getty’s government was responding to increased demands for action, was being 
accused (or anticipating accusation) of not doing enough. Indeed, 1986 is noted in the 
literature as a particularly difficult economic year for the province, and Harrison (1995) 
argues that Getty’s government shouldered blame for policy issues at this time.  
Budget Address 
The government opened the Budget Address with a focus on the “uncertainty in 
the export markets for all our basic commodities” (Alberta, 1987b, p. 247). They sought 
“tough measures to address the new fiscal challenges facing Alberta” while asserting 
their commitment to “protect those Albertans in need” (Ibid). However, the deficit was 
given priority attention in the address, evidenced both by the government’s extensive 
discussion in this area (28 hits for “deficit”) and its “fiscal strategy,” which consisted of a 
deficit reduction of 40 percent and a balanced budget by 1990-91 (Ibid).  
Deficit Reduction and Balancing the Budget by 1990-91 
 The government forecasted a budgetary deficit of $3.3 billion for 1986-87, which 
it noted was the highest per capita in Canada. The imbalance was due to a “dramatic 
decline” in provincial revenues (29 percent) coupled with expenditures that were “too 
high relative to our revenue base” and that “exceed those in other provinces by a 
substantial margin” (pp. 250-251).  
Regarding revenues, the government argued that factors with OPEC, the American 
government and falling grain prices were “developments and trends beyond our borders 
and beyond our control greatly influence Alberta's economic performance and fiscal 
plan” (pp. 247-248). Once again, the blame lies with external factors.  
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Getty’s government planned to make “the necessary fiscal corrections without 
delay,” and argued that “failing to act decisively now could result in a crisis of major 
proportions” (Ibid). Government emphasized its intention to trim and reduce costs, and 
announced expenditure cuts “unparalleled in Canada” at 6.3 percent (p. 251). The deficit 
strategy involved a three-way “attack” on the deficit by suspending revenue transfers to 
the Heritage Fund, downsizing expenditures closer to the Canadian average by 1990-91, 
and substantial increases in taxes (p. 251). Of note here is the aggressive verb “attack,” 
which conveys a sense of urgency towards the deficit and constructs “the deficit” as an 
enemy, and something to receive blame.  
Reducing expenditures was a significant part of deficit reduction plans for 
the year. The following passage is part of the government’s expenditure 
discussion:  
Despite this government's restraint efforts, spending remains too high relative to 
our revenue base.  
Alberta's per capita expenditure base is approximately one-third above the 
national average. During the period 1980-81 to 1986-87, combined expenditure 
grew at an average annual rate of nearly 11 percent, led by spending on social 
programs.23  
We must take action now to realign the government finances. Deficits in the order 
of $3 billion cannot be allowed to continue (p. 250).  
There is a sense of urgency in this passage (“we must take action now…”) and firmness 
regarding the nature of provincial expenditures (“remains too high”) and the 
undesirability of deficits (“deficits….cannot be allowed to continue”) that conveys a 
                                                          
 
23 “Led by spending on social programs” is an interesting add-on here. Is spending that is 
led by social programs more acceptable, and less critiqued?    
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strong commitment to expenditure levels as an issue, as well as the need or intent to do 
something about them. These statements also contain strong assertions, evidenced by 
tense (is, will) and verbs (cannot, must).  
Regarding issues of blame, there is an agent to receive “credit” for expenditure 
restraint, but not one to receive blame for existing high expenditures. Indeed, the 
government asserted in the opening line they had already been restraining (“despite this 
government’s restraint efforts…”). However, inasmuch as government argued that 
“spending remains too high…” and “combined expenditure grew…” there is no specific 
agent to receive blame. This language works to deflect blame for expenditure growth, but 
garner credit for “restraint efforts” and plans to balance the budget. 
Questions arise regarding how “the deficit,” “public spending” and “restraint” 
were framed by important groups in the policy context at the time, and how government 
articulations worked to reconstruct, re-contextualize and/or change these articulations. I 
suggest the urgency displayed in this passage is meant to connect in some way with what 
is being said in the broader context, and examining how government articulations align 
(or do not) with public opinion, opposition politics, and media, seems a salient issue for 
agenda-setting research.   
Proposed solutions for the deficit contained a strong social orientation, as the 
government asked Albertans to “pay more through taxes” to maintain provincial public 
services: 
In this budget, Mr. Speaker, I am asking Albertans to pay more through taxes so 
we can maintain the quality of our programs.  
In considering tax increases, we were concerned with the implications for the 
economy and the impact on low-income Albertans. Three benchmarks were 
adopted. First, Alberta's tax load should remain the lowest of any province; 
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second, the burden of tax increases should be shared between businesses and 
individuals; and third, low-income groups should be protected (p. 254). 
These tax proposals are a noticeable shift from Lougheed’s in 1983 and 1984, 
when the government proposed minor adjustments to provincial taxes. Getty’s proposals 
to personal and corporate taxes would generate significantly more revenue, as well as 
more negative attention. Consequently, one might expect to find government removed as 
the agent proposing tax increases. However, it is clear that Getty’s government made a 
request (I am asking…) in this situation, and it is consequently clear that government is 
making decisions to raise taxes. Here, there is an agent to blame for the presumably 
unpopular decision to raise taxes. In 1983 the decision to raise taxes was framed as “no 
choice,” while the decision in 1984 to restrain expenditures and not raise taxes was 
framed as something government and Albertans desired. Thus Getty’s 1987’s agendas 
contain more transparency concerning policy decisions and proposals compared those of 
Lougheed in 1983 and ‘84. How these different policy articulations were received (re-
contextualized, rejected or accepted for example) given Getty’s orientation to 
transparency Lougheed’s removal of agency and assumption of similarity, might yield 
interesting findings regarding the political and ideological effects of policy discourse, and 
the priority of consensus. And, although these policy moments are long gone, 
examinations of newspaper microfiche, along with archived legislative debates from 
these respective years could offer some insight.  
One additional point of interest between Lougheed and Getty’s tax proposals 
concerns their orientation. In 1987, taxation was a means to social ends (“so that we can 
maintain the quality of our programs”), whereas in 1983 the limited tax increases were 
aimed more directly at fiscal ends (“to reduce the size of the deficit”). The deficit was 
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partly a social issue for government in 1987, but more a fiscal issue in 1983. This shift in 
taxation as a (partial) solution for the deficit on the 1987 agenda leads to questions 
regarding what might have changed in the agenda-setting context. What might have 
occurred that paved the way for Getty’s taxation proposals? What was public opinion at 
the time? Of note in 1986/87 is the particularly dramatic drop in economic output of the 
energy and agriculture sectors, as well as the fact that this was Getty’s second year in 
office – he was relatively new. Thus these tax proposals may have been a confluence of 
an extremely difficult economy and a pressing need for revenue, along with a new 
premier who carried (some) new ideas. How do these different policy articulations work 
in and on their respective contexts at the time? How are they constrained, and how (who) 
do they seek to constrain? Once again, what is missing in this thesis, as well as the 
literature, is a view of the policy context at the time, particularly in reference to how 
“government,” “the deficit,” “Albertans,” and taxation were viewed by the public, media 
and political opposition in these years.  
Two similarities to Lougheed’s discussion of taxation are of note in the three tax 
increase benchmarks, however. First, taxes are discussed as a “burden” and something 
that is ultimately undesirable. Second, the government wished to “ensure” that Alberta’s 
taxes remained the lowest in the country. The following passage is the conclusion of tax 
increase proposals, where Getty’s government hedges tax proposals against criticism by 
pointing to Alberta’s low taxes relative to the rest of the country: 
These measures will add nearly $1 billion to provincial revenue. However, Mr. 
Speaker, Alberta will continue to have no sales tax, no payroll tax and no capital 
tax. Albertans on average will continue to pay lower provincial taxes than other 
Canadians (p. 254). 
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Getty’s government anticipated that some will view taxation as negative, and appealed 
for consensus through Albertans still paying the lowest taxes in Canada. In this situation 
the government followed up asking something potentially controversial with giving back 
to people (maintaining low taxes), and provincial taxation is seen as a political advantage, 
or wiggle room, for consensus. At work here is the potential (re)construction of Alberta 
as a special tax jurisdiction in the country. Also, perhaps more interestingly, taxation 
actually emerges as a special issue in the province – as leverage for consensus.  
Highlighting the drive for consensus at this time are the government’s closing 
remarks of the address: “it is now time, Mr. Speaker, for all Albertans to remember the 
spirit on which our province was built and to join together with new ideas and a renewed 
determination to build a better future for us all” (p. 255). Of importance is that “join(ing) 
together” is centred on government policy proposals. There is a concerted effort in this 
regard at the conclusion of the speech, as the government also argued that “we must all 
rise to the occasion” and “we must be determined in our resolve” (Ibid).  The inclusive 
language (we) assumes similarity, that the “occasion” (the various fiscal, economic and 
social issues discussed in the speech) is the same for all, and that the resolve (proposed 
solutions) are also similar. Here policy works towards consensus through inclusive and 
assumptive language. Lastly, Albertans are constructed as people who cooperate and join 
together, while those who do not “join together,” (perhaps those who oppose 
government), are simultaneously constructed as non-Albertan, thus providing a moral 
sanction against dissenting voices.  
Summary 
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Government priorities in 1987 focussed on the economy and fiscal policy, with 
the Speech from the Throne priorities aimed at the former, and budgetary priorities at the 
latter.  Once again policy articulations were comprised of strong assertions regarding 
government activity. Fiscal policy and the deficit received significant attention in the 
budget, and the government conveyed a strong commitment to the nature of policy issues 
and solutions. As I have argued, this language serves identity purposes, deflects blame 
through categorical assertions, and otherwise seeks a consensus for policy, and 
government, in the broader context.  
Taxation once again emerged as an interesting issue, and there is evidenced of 
both shifting and continuity with Lougheed’s previous agendas. In terms of solutions 
sought for the deficit, Getty’s budgetary  proposals to raise income and business tax 
represents a shift from Lougheed, as does the manner in which tax proposals were framed 
as specific requests by government. Consequently, questions arise regarding what led to 
the decision to raise taxes, as well as how the language in which tax increases were 
framed might affect consensus seeking.   
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Chapter Six: The Getty Government 1992 
Don Getty was still holding office as Premier in the early 1990s when the 
provincial economy struggled once again. The government recorded a deficit of almost 
$2 billion in 1991, marking their sixth of what would be nine consecutive deficits. Polls 
showed rising public disapproval of the government, resulting in what Cooper (1996) 
argues was Alberta’s first competitive political party system in years.24 Tupper, Pratt and 
Urquhart (1992) summed up politics for the Conservatives during this period as a time of 
increasing public demands upon a decreasing provincial treasury. In the passage below, 
they discuss increased opposition in the legislature, and issues regarding the nature of 
democracy under the Conservative government:  
Debates about the quality of democratic life are not new to Alberta. The growth of 
government in the Lougheed years, the development of quasi-public institutions 
like the Alberta Energy Company and the active governmental pursuit of 
economic diversification led to an expansion of the cabinet's power. Alberta's 
opposition parties, especially the New Democrats in the 1970s, often worried 
about the growing imbalance between the executive and the legislature, the lack 
of public accountability and an excess of secrecy in provincial administration. But 
their concerns for more open government never engaged the public's imagination 
during the boom years …. 
But in the early 1990s, questions about the quality of democracy in Alberta are 
much more widely debated. As noted earlier, Alberta's environmental movement, 
like its counterparts elsewhere in the democratic world, stresses the need for 
greater public participation in policy-making and administration. Greater partisan 
competition and the advent of larger, more aggressive legislative oppositions have 
also contributed to more careful scrutiny of the government (pp. 55-56). 
                                                          
 
24 As previously discussed, the Liberals under Laurence Decore were building 
momentum in the province. In the 1989 provincial election, for example, while the NDP 
maintained their level of support from the 1986 election, the Liberal party went from 12.2 
percent and four seats the previous election to 28.6 percent and eight seats. By contrast, 
Conservative support slipped from 51.1 percent and 61 seats to 44.4 percent and 59 seats. 
Much of the Liberal party’s gain can be attributed to Decore’s persistent criticism of the 
government’s handling of the deficit. 
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These environmental and democratic concerns appeared on the government agenda as 
priorities in 1990, and both issues remained in 1992. 
Government Agenda 1992 
Speech from the Throne priorities in 1992 included five “ever changing realities,” 
which covered policy areas of economic, fiscal, social, legislative and environmental 
policy. The Budget Address saw the government outline four point fiscal and economic 
strategies.   
1992 Throne: Priorities 1992 Budget: Economic Strategy 
  
Economic reality Personal income tax cut 
Fiscal reality Business tax cut 
Environmental reality Support farmers and small business 
Social reality Capital works job creation 
Constitutional reality  
 
 
 
“Reality” and “change” were important words in 1992. Searches for reality(ies) 
produced 18 hits in the Speech from the Throne (one in the Budgetary Address), while 
searches for change(ing) revealed eight in the Throne Speech and fifteen in the Budgetary 
Address. Almost all hits for “change” in the budget referred to programs and initiatives 
government was actively changing. In the Throne Speech, however, change took on an 
 
     
    1992 Budget: Fiscal Strategy 
     
    Balance the budget 
    Legislate spending limits 
    Restructure programs 
    Cut internal government operations 
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agent-less process, as the government referred to their five priorities as “ever-changing 
realities.”  
Speech from the Throne word searches for “my government” produced 66 hits in 
1992, and much of the active and protective wording similar to that used by Lougheed 
and Getty (1987) is on display. There were also hits for what I classify as democratic 
wording, at six hits for “consultation,” and ten hits for “listen(ing).” This wording speaks 
to a higher concern for identity issues than in years previous. In addition to an active and 
protective government, the projected identity is also one that “consults” with and 
“listens” to Albertans, one of a democratic government. A discursive priority of this 
language was constructing an identity that that seeks consensus with people in the 
broader context.  
Speech from the Throne 
Regarding the province’s “changing realities,” the government argued the 
following:   
My government, the people of Alberta, and all Canadians face enormous 
challenges in adapting to the new and ever changing realities our nation and our 
world offer us. Governments cannot stop or control change, but together with the 
people we can have a major influence on our future. These new realities will find 
us confronting issues more complex than we have ever faced, but difficult 
problems also provide us with the opportunity for renewal so we can make our 
world a better place. 
As we address the new fiscal, economic, environmental, social, and constitutional 
realities together, my government and Albertans know that the role of government 
and the role of citizens will continue to change. Co-operation, listening, and 
consultation are required more than ever... (p. 1). 
There is a lot to digest in this passage, but the general theme is consensus seeking and 
constructing across very broad, and in many ways conflicting policy areas. Regarding 
issues of blame, for example, there is no agent to receive blame in the province’s 
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“realities.” The challenges, or issues were “offered” by vague agents of the nation and the 
world (once again external), and an even more vague “change,” which could not be 
stopped or controlled. Provincial issues thus appear as naturally occurring, and inasmuch 
as they are understood in this manner, are impossible to critique. Here “change” and 
“changing reality” are nominalizations that remove government as an agent of blame in 
the broadest of policy issues.  
Getty’s government sought to construct a democratic identity through the usage of 
“cooperation,” “listening,” and “consultation.”25  Keyword searches for “listen(ing)” and 
“consult(ation)” yielded ten and six hits respectively, while cooperation yielded five hits 
(two of which saw the government call for co-operation with Albertans). Although there 
is not a specific subject in the above passage (listening, cooperating and consulting are 
simply “required”), the subject is clearer in other instances, as the government argued: 
“My government will listen to and work with Alberta's processors…and our investors 
and exporters in order to improve competitiveness” (p. 2). Of interest is how “listen” 
combines with active wording to construct an identity for government that would work to 
improve competitiveness and listen. Thus, in addition to the active and protective 
government of previous years, Getty’s 1992 government also sought the identity of a 
democratic government – one that listens to, consults with, and cooperates. All priorities 
for the year contained this democratic wording, which framed government and its 
                                                          
 
25 The government’s environmental priority provides a good example: “…my 
government has conducted an extensive listening and consultation process over the past 
two years to develop new legislation. This legislation, written by Albertans, should be 
concluded in this session and will be amongst the most comprehensive and progressive in 
the world” (Alberta, 1992a, p.2).  
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policies in a manner that reflected public opinion, and ultimately in a manner that sought 
consensus.    
Recall Tupper, Pratt and Urquhart’s (1992) argument that “[G]reater partisan 
competition and the advent of larger, more aggressive legislative oppositions have also 
contributed to more careful scrutiny of the government” (pp. 55-56). The democratic 
wording in the Speech from the Throne is evidence of this scrutiny. What is not being 
said by government, but is being said in the broader context – the identity government 
sought to counteract through its policy articulations – is that government was not 
democratic, not listening, and not consulting. As I have previously argued, this broader 
context is an area where governments lack power. Given Getty’s attention a democratic 
identity, questions arise regarding the production, circulation and consumption of counter 
articulations of “government” at the time. Was debate centered on blaming government, 
and constructing government as not competent, rather than exploring alternatives to 
ongoing policy issues? How are issues of blame and identity attached to other 
articulations of government? For example, was Laurence Decore’s Liberal party’s 
growing support linked to proposing new, more attractive alternatives, or to constructing 
and discrediting government in certain ways, and otherwise seeking consensus amongst 
an increasingly restless populace? Does democracy play out in a manner that reflects the 
self-interest of politicians or members of the media rather than debate? 
The above passage also constructs a consensus through inclusive and assumptive 
language. For example, in the opening line the government argues: “my government, the 
people of Alberta and all of Canada face enormous challenges…our world offer us.” This 
inclusive language is an assumption that social, fiscal, economic, etc. issues on the 
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government agenda are the same as those of the public. Rather, government issues are 
presented as universal issues. By including Albertans together in these “realities,” 
government speaks for Albertans, and there is less room for difference in terms of what 
challenges are faced and how those challenges are articulated, because government and 
people face them together. Further evidence of these assumptions is seen in the words 
“together with the people,” “as we work together,” and in the second paragraph “as we 
address the new…realities together.”  
Getty’s 1992 government displayed more saliency for identity and consensus than 
any previous government, evidenced by an increase in hits for active wording, as well as 
language that constructed government as democratic. In these times of increasing fiscal, 
economic, and political difficulty, the Speech from the Throne emerged as a particularly 
interesting document to examine, and a potentially important means by which 
governments interact with those in the broader context. 
Budget Address 
The economy and fiscal policy were top priority areas in the 1992 budget; the 
government opened the speech discussing the “uncertainty” regarding both the economy 
and the “fiscal realities that lie ahead” (Alberta, 1992b, p. 383). Although the province 
had been “challenged as never before,” the economic plan would “keep Alberta growing 
while most of the country is suffering from a recession.” The government asserted the 
fiscal plan would keep taxes low and maintain priority programs (Ibid).  
The following passage captures the government’s approach to fiscal and 
economic policy, as well as social policy considerations: 
Some would argue that drastic action is required to offset the unexpected drop in 
resource revenue. That would be unwise this year. This government will not hurt 
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Albertans by sharply raising taxes or slashing health, education, or seniors' 
programs when the economy is struggling. 
Others would argue that massive government spending is required to strengthen 
Alberta's economy. This would be an even more serious mistake. We must not 
compound the fiscal problems resulting from low resource revenue by abandoning 
this government's tight control of spending. As Albertans and other Canadians 
have learned only too well, it is easy to add spending but very difficult to cut it. 
This government has chosen a sensible course for these difficult times (Ibid, p. 
385). 
This passage is unique in the analysis because of the inclusion of different social and 
economic voices, and what appears to be a deliberating process. The inclusion of 
difference in this passage highlights the dominant feature of the omission or erasure of 
different voices on government agendas. Most often in this analysis, alternative 
discourses are never brought up, and the audience is presented with universal views of 
policy issues and proposed solutions. Certainly, the above Speech from the Throne 
excerpt contains little difference. Most often in agenda speeches, the mechanisms of 
government agenda-setting are rarely on display, and it is thus difficult to examine how 
language, ideas, expectations, active voices (public opinion, for example) might exert 
power and influence on government officials. The “decision-making” of governments is 
rarely on display due to the omission of alternative discourses and naturalizing language, 
making it more difficult to contest government policy articulations.  
Consensus is nonetheless a goal in this instance, as Getty’s government uses 
hyperbolic language (“drastic action” required, “sharply increasing taxes,” and “massive 
government spending”) to discredit and reject economic and social voices. Rather, 
government would choose its own “sensible” path, where sensible also discredits the 
alternatives, and frames government proposals in a moral language. Here, power is 
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evidenced through language use that speaks for, or represents, economic and social 
voices in a manner that discredits. Once again, questions arise regarding the broader 
context, particularly, why might Getty’s government have included different voices in the 
agenda speech?  
Economic strategy. Discussion of the economy saw a familiar pattern that 
located blame in external factors, as “gloomy news from outside the province as affected 
Alberta” via the Bank of Canada’s “single-minded” fight against inflation, the Goods and 
Services Tax (GST), “weak performance with major trading partners has directly affected 
Alberta” (Alberta, 1992b, p. 383). 
The economic strategy (Economic Agenda ’92) was a “four-point plan to 
strengthen the Alberta economy and create more jobs for Albertans.” The four initiatives 
included personal income tax cuts, corporate tax cuts of one percent, “support for small 
business and rural Alberta through royalty holidays and incentives for famers, and a 
“work intensive capital project” (p. 385-86). The current budget would enhance 
“Albertans’ already substantial tax advantage; Alberta will continue to be the best place 
in Canada to live and work” (p.385). These tax proposals are a shift in direction from 
those of Getty’s proposals in 1987, when taxation was increased for social purposes. In 
1992 taxation was viewed as a means to economic ends, thus signifying an emphasis on 
economic priorities over social priorities.   
Fiscal strategy. Fiscal policy, particularly the deficit, was an important priority 
for the year, and it argued that restoring fiscal balance was the “second major focus of the 
budget” (p. 388). The projected deficit of $2.3 billion for 1992-93 was a “serious 
problem” and a “very difficult” fiscal situation – the government would “tackle” the 
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deficit with “determination and a strong collective will” (Ibid). Once again, the deficit 
emerged as an enemy or threat, and is consequently constructed as the problem, 
potentially deflecting blame from government. Relatedly, there was a concerted effort to 
articulate the deficit also as a revenue issue (rather than an expenditure issue), as Getty’s 
government asserted the key difficulty with provincial finances was poor resource 
revenues. Elsewhere in the Budget Address, the government argued that although other 
provinces were also grappling with deficits, Alberta was the only province with a revenue 
problem. Government asserted their expenditure management had kept spending in 
check, and that Alberta had the best expenditure management record of any government 
in Canada. Moreover, their proposed “spending control legislation” was part of the 
“commitment to expenditure management.” The legislation would set “firm limits” on 
spending, keep taxes low, and “ensure that Alberta does not fall into the trap of spending 
more when revenue improves” (p. 389). The government also briefly discussed 
increasing taxes (specifically income tax and fuel tax), only to argue it would “seek a 
better solution” through expenditure controls (Ibid). There was a clear effort in 1992 to 
articulate the deficit as a revenue issue, rather than an expenditure issue. How these 
articulations reflect, re-contextualize, or transform other prominent articulations would 
provide insight into how policy played out in this period, particularly in regards to 
consensus-seeking.  
The fiscal plan involved balancing the budget over the “medium-term” by 1996-
97, primarily through expenditure cuts. Getty’s government proposed to cut another 
1,000 public sector jobs (bringing the total since 1985-86 to 4,400), salary freezes, wage 
restraint and pension reforms, and planned to once again reduce expenditures to their 
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travel and hosting budget. The government was also actively “reviewing the need for 
existing offices, boards, agencies, commissions, committees, and task forces,” and 
planned to cut funding to eleven departments (p. 389). The government argued they 
couldn’t balance the budget without also cutting important social programs of health and 
education. Indeed, government was giving these two areas “time to prepare for the new 
fiscal realities” (p. 386). 
Summary 
The Speech from the Throne emerged as a particularly interesting document in 
1992, where policy contained strong assertions about the nature of government activity. 
In addition to the active and helpful government of previous years, Getty’s government 
also sought to construct an identity as a listening government, a democratic government. 
This policy language displays an increased concern for identity. Policy issues were 
articulated as “ever-changing realities,” a nominalization that naturalizes policy issues, 
thus removing government as an agent of blame in and again, driving towards a 
consensus or approval for government. The Speech form the Throne also contained 
assumptive and inclusive language, which worked to construct one view (government’s 
view) of policy issues and solutions, but also, constructed Albertans as working with 
government, in which case there is a constructed consensus. 
Another intriguing part of the policy debates in 1992 was the inclusion in the 
Budget Address of different economic and social voices, and some level of deliberation 
between the two. These features denaturalize policy issues and decision making, and 
consequently, facilitate (rather than supress) critique of government and its policies. 
However, the language ultimately aimed to discredit alternative voices, and agenda 
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policy is nonetheless seen in its orientation to reducing difference and seeking consensus. 
The 1992 Budget Address also saw a concerted effort to articulate the deficit as a revenue 
issue, as we will see, this quickly disappeared in the course of the ongoing economic and 
political problems one year later.  
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Chapter Seven: The Klein Government 1993 
Amidst a continuing decline in political support, fuelled by concern over 
Alberta’s growing deficit (over $3.4 billion in 1992-93), Premier Getty announced his 
resignation in the fall of 1992. A few months later, he was succeeded as premier by Ralph 
Klein. Faced with a serious challenge from the Laurence Decore-led Liberals, the Klein 
government focussed its rhetoric and policies on tackling the deficit and growing debt. 
This approach bore fruit when the Klein government won a majority in spring election 
that followed.  
Klein’s first full term as premier (1993-1997) is noted in the literature for 
comprehensive changes to government operations and programs. In fact, Klein’s 
Conservatives and the Mike Harris Conservatives in Ontario are often cited as the leaders 
in public welfare reform in Canada. Amongst the changes were payment cuts to schools 
and hospitals, the deregulation and privatization of government services, and the 
restructuring and scaling back of social assistance. Ponak, Reshef, and Taras (2003) 
explain that cuts ranged from 5.6 percent in basic education, to 15.3 percent in higher 
education and 17.7 percent cuts to health care. While Reid (2001) adds that overall 
spending in Alberta declined by $2.8 billion between 1993 and 1997, with social services 
posting a significant $520 million (20 percent) decrease in funding.  
Government Agenda 1993    
The government highlighted “four fundamental [election] commitments” as 
priorities for the year. They argued that these priorities were to “guide the government 
through all its deliberations and actions” over the next four years, regardless of what 
issues they faced (Alberta, 1993a, p. 8). Budgetary priorities echoed those outlined in the 
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Speech from the Throne. Balancing the budget, and economic policies aimed at “job 
creation” were top priorities in both agendas.  
1993 Throne: Election Commitments 1993 Budget: Fiscal plan 
  
Balance the budget Legislation to balance the budget 
Job creation Set clear priorities 
Streamline, deregulate, reorganize Economic strategy 
government Change the way government does business 
Listen to Albertans  
“Change” was a specific priority, as well as a recurring theme in all other 
priorities. Word searches yielded 23 hits for “change(ing)” in the Budget Address and 35 
in The Speech from the Throne. Government use of this word saw examples of Getty’s 
agentless change, as well as an active, comprehensive change occurring or planned for 
government programs. The vast majority dealt with the latter active change.  
Much like Getty’s Conservatives the year before, Klein sought to connect 
government priorities with Albertans through democratic wording such as listen(ing) with 
five hits in the budget; one of the Speech from the Throne priorities was “listening to 
Albertans.” Searches for consult(ation) produced 15 hits in the Speech from the Throne, 
many of which referred to public consultation, or “the public consultation process.” This 
heightened concern for identity management represents a significant carry-over from the 
previous Getty agenda. Other areas of continuity were also present, including solutions 
sought to economic and fiscal issues. Despite all the talk of “change,” there was 
significant continuity.  
Speech from the Throne 
The following passage from the beginning of the speech captures several different 
uses of the word “change”: 
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Hon. Members, the great winds of change are sweeping through Alberta again.26 
The election of 1993 produced 49 new MLAs, virtually the greatest number of 
first-time members in our history. That means a fresh new perspective and a 
strong commitment to change.  
My government recognizes that these are extremely challenging times to be an 
MLA. Widespread discontent among voters has fueled a cynicism about 
governments all over the world. Changing times require a fundamental change in 
the way government conducts the people's business. Positive change is what this 
government stands for, and positive change is what it will deliver (p. 1). 
Stewart (1995) argues that Klein’s “Conservative party presented itself as the agent of 
change” (p. 44). This presentation is on display in Klein’s agendas of 1993, and much of 
the Speech from the Throne is understood as driving towards changing public perception 
of the provincial Conservatives. Indeed, the government mentions “widespread 
discontent” among voters, cynicism, and difficult times to be an MLA in the last 
paragraph. Klein’s government also argued his government offered 49 new MLAs, and a 
“fresh new perspective.” The identity at work is one of a changed government, and one 
that is different from the previous Conservatives. The focus in this passage is not on 
discussing a specific policy issue, but more directly on constructing government as 
“changed,” as well as gaining support (consensus) for government and its eminent policy 
changes. 
The first usage of change in the above passage, however, (“the great winds of 
change”) is a metaphor, where there is no agent behind “change” – it sweeps across the 
province. The government mentions a vague, agentless change (changing times) in the 
third line of the second paragraph, which serves as a justification, nay a requirement, for 
                                                          
 
26 Prior to this statement the government hearkened back to the province’s first 
legislature in 1905, when the “winds of change were sweeping across the prairie” 
(Alberta, 1993a, p.7).  
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the active “fundamental” and “positive” change to the “people’s business.” In these 
examples, “change” serves as a nominalization that removes human agency from 
complex processes, and “change” potentially receives the blame both for what has gone 
wrong, and for any proposed solutions. The strong propositional commitment here of 
what change is doing, and what change requires, are categorical assertions about what is 
happening and what must be done (rather than what could be happening and what might 
be done, for example). This language promotes the identity of a government with a firm 
direction. The more salient discursive issue here, however, concerns how these assertions 
are produced, circulated, and particularly received, and how they resonate with what is 
already being said (public opinion, opposition, and media, for example). These strong 
assertions, coupled with the nominalizing language of “change,” make critique more 
difficult inasmuch as agents (government) are removed from policy processes and they 
appear as naturally occurring, thus rendering a consensus more likely. Furthering the 
cause is how government constructs itself as the agent of “positive change” in the last 
line. The manner in which change is framed, as “required” and universally “positive,” 
renders a critique more difficult and closes off alternatives, and is thus seen as driving 
towards consensus.  
Listen to Albertans. Listening to Albertans was stressed as a priority in itself, 
and mentioned many times throughout the speech as government discussed other 
priorities. This focus on “listening” is one area of continuity with Getty’s 1992 agenda, 
and is indication that constructing a democratic identity was important. Arguably this 
priority increased in saliency for Klein because “listening” appeared as a specific priority. 
Of particular interest however, is how the government’s use of active change, coupled 
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with democratic wording, leads to an assumption that Getty’s government was not 
listening to Albertans, and through  assumption, to blame for policy issues. The following 
passage does not contain “listening,” but the government nonetheless uses wording that 
constructs Getty’s government in this manner: 
We all know that changing times demand new approaches and new ways of doing 
things. We know we cannot meet the challenges of today and tomorrow with 
yesterday's thinking and last week's ideas. Successful businesses know that if they 
stay the same, they are left behind. In 1993 my government has caught up to 
Albertans in their thinking. My government has a plan, and the heart of that plan 
is providing open, accessible, responsive, and affordable government (p. 8). 
In arguing government had “caught up” with Albertans, the assumption is that the 
previous government was out of step with Albertans. Moreover, there is an assumption of 
complete disconnect with Getty’s policies in this passage, as Klein proposed “new 
approaches” and “new ways of doing things,” while categorically throwing out 
“yesterday’s thinking and last week’s ideas.” Here Klein’s policies (the “new”) are 
framed in a moral manner as categorically good, while the “old” is categorically bad, in 
an effort to distance the current regime from the previous. What is potentially lost in 
these categorical assertions is the amount of continuity between the two governments.  
Also of interest, the inclusive word in the opening lines “we” aims to reduce 
difference, as only one view of what is known is presented. Consequently, the 
government and public appear to have the same view. Combined with the strong appeal 
to common sense, evidenced through “we all know,” government policy is constructed as 
both democratic and common sense. This combination is a potentially powerful example 
of consensus constructing, inasmuch as democracy and common sense are valued and 
should not be questioned.  
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The issue of the deficit. The government mentioned “deficit” three times in the 
Throne Speech, but offered little discussion of the issue. However, deficit legislation (the 
Deficit Elimination Act) would aid in their “first commitment” of balancing the 
provincial budget within four years. They asserted Albertans wanted government to pay 
down the provincial debt and put its “financial house in order” (Alberta, 1993a, p. 8). The 
government offered the following in its fiscal policy discussion:  
A perceived lack of fiscal responsibility is perhaps the greatest reason for the 
cynicism that people feel towards governments today, but my government is 
changing that perception in this province, and not because it is expedient or 
fashionable. This government is initiating fundamental change in the way it 
manages the public purse because there is no other choice. It is that simple (Ibid, 
p. 8). 
There are two “changes” at work here, that of changing public perception and a 
“fundamental change” in fiscal policy. “Fundamental change” is occurring because there 
is “no choice.” Framing policies as “no choice” is a strong appeal for consensus removes 
government as an agent from a potentially controversial policy decision, thus 
(potentially) deflecting criticism and blame, and seeking a consensus. The strong 
propositional commitment to “fundamental change” as common sense (“it is that 
simple”) also seeks consensus, inasmuch as people do not, or feel they should not, 
question something that is “that simple.” Moreover, the “fundamental change” in fiscal 
policy suggests that Klein’s fiscal policies were categorically different from Getty’s. 
Inasmuch as Klein’s policies were viewed as fiscally responsible, the assumption is that  
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Getty’s government mismanaged public finances.27   
Job creation. The government’s second election commitment involved “creating 
an environment that would allow the private sector to create 110,000 new jobs for 
Albertans over the next four years” (Ibid). In an effort to “change the way it does 
business” the government planned a “major shift” in economic development policy, in 
which their focus was to provide “a climate conducive to investment and job creation” (p. 
9).  Toward 2000 Together and Seizing Opportunity were identified as important policy 
documents. Of note here is Toward 2000 Together, which was initiated by Getty’s 
government, and even mentioned as a forthcoming economic document in 1992’s Speech 
from the Throne. There is no mention of this connection in 1993. Rather, Klein’s 
economic policies were framed in a manner that disconnected them from Getty’s:  
The government's approach to economic development represents an important 
change in the way of doing business in this province. It makes sense in today's 
global economy….It is based on what Albertans have said will work (p. 9). 
Toward 2000 Together is an area of continuity between the two governments, and so too 
is the democratic wording. Getty’s government argued the previous year “the 
cornerstone” of Toward 2000 Together was “listening to people”; Klein’s government 
referred to an “extensive public consultation process” when discussing the document. 
However, Klein’s articulations contain a shift, and a stronger drive toward consensus, 
evidenced through his government’s appeal to common sense. 
                                                          
 
27 Of interest is the anomaly of weaker modality, evidenced in the first line through the 
words “perceived” and “perhaps,” which leads to weaker assertions regarding the 
previous government’s fiscal performance, as well as voter discontent. Arguably this 
passage has less interest in blaming Getty’s government (although this blame is 
nonetheless present), and more to do with the expressed goal of changing public 
perception. 
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Budget Address  
The four point fiscal strategy involved a four-year legislated plan to balance the 
budget, setting and sticking to “clear priorities,” “acting boldly” on the province’s 
economic strategy, and “changing the way the government does business” (Alberta, 
1993b, p.2605). Of these four objectives, “revitalizing the economy is clearly at the top of 
the list” (Ibid, p. 2606).  
The “core” of 1993’s economic development strategy was tax and regulatory 
reform (p.9). Klein planned to build on Alberta’s tax advantage to create the most 
competitive economy in North America, and “strengthen the Alberta Advantage around 
the globe,” rather than “buy(ing) prosperity through higher taxes” (Ibid). The government 
intended to eliminate international trade barriers, end direct business subsidies, and 
eliminate “all but absolutely essential regulations” to generate “lasting” jobs in the 
private sector. Of interest is the amount of continuity between Klein’s economic plans 
and those of Getty in 1992. For example, Getty also stressed removing trade barriers, 
expanding international trade, and deregulation.28 Moreover, Klein promised to build on 
the provincial strengths of agriculture, energy, forestry, tourism, small business and high 
technology – Getty’s Conservatives highlighted these areas in their 1992 diversification 
efforts. Central to the economic strategy of both premiers was a “job creation” initiative, 
and, both governments referenced Toward 2000 Together in their economic plans (both 
                                                          
 
28 “…Albertans tell my government and my government believes that business and 
individuals should not be subject to overregulation and that the private sector, not 
government, will determine our ultimate economic success” (Alberta, 1992a, p.2). 
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governments attempted to connect this policy document directly to Albertans). Lastly, 
both governments sought taxation as an economic tool.   
The issue of the deficit.  The government argued the deficit, debt and interest 
payments were a “national problem all governments and all Canadians must address” 
(Alberta, 1993c, p. 1).29 They asserted the province was “overspending,” and that the rate 
of overspending was increasing. Thus, unlike the previous Conservatives, Klein’s 
government articulated the deficit as an expenditure problem. In 1993, government 
spending, deficit, and debt became an enemy to attack, as Klein pushed for a “strategy 
that attacks our fiscal problems now” (1993c, p.8). I view Klein’s shift to overspending 
as an issue of blame and identity, where Klein’s new, “changed” government could 
accept the argument of overspending because his Conservative government did not have 
a spending record, and accepting an overspending issue would distance his government 
from Getty’s. This articulation aims to change public perception of the Conservative 
government.   
Despite this shift, there was continuation in proposed solutions as Klein’s 
government proposed, and eventually carried out, comprehensive cutbacks.30 The budget 
was to see a deficit reduction of 22% solely through expenditure cuts, and called for a 
                                                          
 
29 This source (1993c) for the Budget Address was a printed document, while 1993b was 
obtained from the Alberta Hansard website in the form of a transcription. The printed 
document is intended to be circulated and consumed as a text, rather than a speech. In this 
instance there are two different productions of the agenda, and questions arise concerning 
differences in their production, consumption and distribution, particularly in regards to 
consensus-seeking.  
 
30 Klein’s government also planned “conservative revenue projections” that were based 
on the average of the previous five year resource revenue actuals.  
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20% reduction in overall program spending and a balanced budget by 1996-97. Getty’s 
government also planned to balance the budget through expenditure cuts by 1996-97. 
Klein stressed “all areas of government are on the table,” including health, education and 
social services (1993c, p.11). Recall that Getty’s government was giving these policy 
areas “time to prepare” for cutbacks. Similar to Getty’s Budgetary Agenda the previous 
year (and Lougheed’s of 1983), Klein’s government proposed special legislation to 
address the deficit; the Deficit Elimination Act stipulated that gains in revenue would go 
to reduce the deficit and debt. Also, the government sought a tax system that was 
“focused on competitiveness” and planned a tax commission, whose central concern was 
determining what could be done “to improve Alberta’s competitive advantage” (Ibid). 
Taxation as an economic tool represents another area of continuity between the two 
governments. 
I view Klein’s fiscal and economic policy (as contained in the agenda) as an 
extension or fulfillment of many of Getty’s 1992 policies. This finding supports the 
existing provincial literature that draws attention to continuity between Getty’s 1992 and 
Klein’s 1993 governments (see Harrison, 1995; Taft, 1997). Perhaps Kevin Taft (1997) 
put it best when he argued “[I]n other words, the severe cuts of the Klein government 
began on budgets that were already relatively low…The Getty government took pride in 
the cuts and was pleased to be leading a government that was steadily getting smaller” 
(1997; p. 23). I found there was little in the way of “revolutionary” ideas and solutions 
presented in Klein’s 1993 agendas. Klein’s policies would not have been possible without 
the cutbacks and downsizing the Lougheed government introduced in 1983 and 1984, 
1986, and particularly in the 1990s with Getty’s government. Indeed, Klein’s policy 
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proposals occurred, discursively, in a context where cutbacks were already taking place, 
and where an opposition party (Laurence Decore’s Liberals) had built up significant 
public support on the platform of budget cuts and no tax increases. Questions arise 
regarding public opinion. Specifically, were politicians responding to public demand? 
Were politicians constructing public demand? Rather, how might government, the 
broader public, media, and political opposition be implicated in this continuity – how, 
over years of increasing scarcity and conflict, did different articulations emerge (or not), 
how were certain issues silenced, shifted, accepted, and challenged, in and amongst 
public opinion, the media, and political opposition? 
Change. Change was a recurring theme in the address, evidenced both by the title 
of the address A Plan for Change, as well as comments throughout regarding changes and 
changing times. However, the construction of government as a business (“changing the 
way government does business” was a priority in 1993’s fiscal plan; “the people’s 
business” was used three times in the Speech from the Throne) stood out as an important 
change or shift in articulating government. The terminology of “people’s business” is 
understood as a branding of the provincial sector as a business, and otherwise 
incorporating business language, and market strategies and values into public policy in an 
effort to restructure government. Klein’s A Better Way, released in 1994, offers an outline 
of this “people’s business,” and details restructuring plans for every department. It is in 
this document where Klein’s changes take traction in policy – changes that have been 
widely covered in the literature. Of interest is that the “people’s business” and its 
associated language transferred from one policy document to another, and one level of 
government to another. Here, department heads and government bureaucrats are also of 
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interest in the agenda consensus seeking – where policy shifts in degrees from more 
directly calling upon addressees to take on a particular view of the world (government as 
business) to forms of calling upon addressees to act (implementing government as 
business, and being a particular kind of actor in this process), to paraphrase Muntigl 
(2002). This connection between broad government agendas, and more specific 
department agendas is evidence of agendas within agendas, and provides a path to 
examine policy as it moves beyond agenda-setting and consensus seeking into 
deliberation and implementation in various departments – an examination of a policy 
lifespan. Discourse analysis provides the theory and methods to examine policy as it 
passes through these various levels of government and out to policy recipients, where 
much of the work of government restructuring occurs, as policies and specific 
subjectivities are (re)constructed to align with fiscal priorities, and as policy transitions to 
more direct forms calling upon addresses (bureaucrats, and eventually policyrecipients) 
to act.  
Summary  
Despite all the talk of change in 1993, there was significant continuity between 
Klein’s and Getty’s agendas. The economy and fiscal issues were at the top of the agenda 
for Klein’s Conservatives in 1993, as balancing the budget, job creation and restructuring 
government were priority areas in both the Throne and Budget Speeches.31 The agendas 
of 1993 saw similar language to what has been observed in Getty’s 1992 agendas, with 
                                                          
 
31 The following themes, or approaches to governing, also emerged as priorities; “set 
clear priorities,” “listen to Albertans,” and change – in particular the oft repeated “change 
the way we do business.” These themes were stressed throughout government discussion 
of fiscal and economic issues, and as issues by themselves. 
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addition language that sought to distance the current from the old (Klein from Getty), 
frame policies as common sense, and construct government as a business. This latter 
articulation of government as a business is of interest, and leads to queries into how 
agenda policy travels to and resonates with politicians and bureaucrats, an additional 
group involved in consensus seeking. 
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Chapter Eight: Discussion and Conclusion 
My primary interest has been to examine the impact of discourse on government 
agendas. And my primary assertion is that there is far more going on in agenda-setting 
than laying out priorities. Indeed, in addition to proposing policy, governments articulate 
issues and problems, (re)construct particular identities, and naturalize policy processes 
and issues, in a manner that seeks consensus. Given the recurring periods of economic, 
fiscal, politically challenging times in the province – periods of focussing events – these 
are challenging times for consensus seeking in the province. Yet, there is a lack research 
that examines how policy plays out at the level of agenda-setting and issue salience. In 
this concluding section I will document my findings by offering a preliminary 
understanding of government agenda-discourse during these periods, and layout a 
direction for future agenda-setting and consensus-seeking research.   
Agenda Discourse and Consensus Seeking   
It is my finding that much of the language in the Budgetary Address and Speeches 
from the Throne drives toward a consensus for government and its policies. In some 
instances the need or desire for consensus was clear as governments actively sought 
“cooperation” or “working together” through explicit appeals. Generally, however, policy 
language drove toward consensus through the omission and/or suppression of alternative 
policy voices, particularly in areas of identity and blame, where the causes of policy 
issues (of which government was often absent as an agent of blame) and their solutions 
(of which government had been active agents) deflect blame and promote an identity of a 
government that was actively working to resolve a given issue. The language in which 
issues were articulated was often categorical, leaving less room for conflicting opinions. 
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Governments also assumed working together and cooperating (in which case there is a 
constructed consensus), employed nominalizations, metaphors and wording that 
naturalized policy issues and processes.  
Consensus-seeking in the Speech from the Throne primarily involved identity 
(re)construction. The respective Alberta governments in this study did not generally 
engage in significant discussion of policy causes and solutions. For example, The Speech 
from the Throne did not contain detailed discussion of the deficit, as Getty’s 1987 Throne 
Speech contained the most hits for “deficit” (four) for any year of interest (in contrast, the 
Budget Address for the same year contained 28 instances of “deficit”). Rather, policy 
articulations dealt with (proposed) solutions to policy issues. Overwhelmingly, 
statements of policy constructed government as categorically helpful, protective, and 
active in various policy areas through an absence of subjective markers that could 
indicate an expression of opinion, as well as an absence of markers of a weak modality 
regarding government activity. Each speech contained examples of this language, and 
“my government” or “this government” generally stood as markers of these identity 
statements. This issue can be seen as a (discursive) priority for each government in its 
respective year of interest, albeit one that is never openly acknowledged, or necessarily 
perceived by the author(s). And, as the policy context became increasingly difficult for 
the provincial Conservatives into the early 1990s, there is evidence of increased saliency 
– as Getty’s (1992) and Klein’s Speech from the Throne each displayed more hits for 
active wording, and new hits for wording that constructed government as democratic. 
Moreover, Getty’s nominalization of “ever-changing realities” and Klein’s discussions of 
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“change” sought identities that were “not to blame” for policy issues, and “not Getty’s 
government,” respectively.  
In the Budget Address, discussion of fiscal issues, particularly the deficit, 
provided an opportunity to examine how successive governments attempted to sort 
through important social and economic policy issues. Presumably unpopular decisions, 
such as those to cutback spending in a particular area, or tax increases, were often framed 
as “no choice” decisions, thus camouflaging the decisions being made, and hedging 
against criticism. Yet despite this, governments always sought to establish the identity of 
“prudent,” “efficient” and “sound financial managers,” and to assure people they had 
tight control of expenditures. It is here where “the deficit” (and various associated words 
such as “expenditure restraint,” “cutting back,” “efficiency” and “people programs” 
“spurring the economy”) represents a very conflicting set of policy interests and 
expectations, as it spans important and economic, fiscal, and social policy issues. All of 
this played out on the Budget Address, and I suggest that the Budget Address receives 
higher circulation and consumption than Throne Speeches, deals more directly with 
government decisions (and disguising those decisions), and is generally the agenda of 
greater public (and academic) interest during these periods.  
All of this is to stress the importance of talk as action, and talk as an important 
part of what governments do in agenda-setting. In addition to setting priorities, 
governments also represent and construct complex processes and issues particular ways. 
And, inasmuch as government agendas are also speeches that are mass distributed and 
consumed, those setting the agenda act in and on the agenda-setting context through the 
agenda. Policy decisions are not only reflections or products of specific social contexts 
110 
 
consisting of different social structures, identities and relationships, but they (re)create 
and transform those social structures and relations. Rather, government officials 
(re)create and transform social relations and structures, and interact with people along 
these lines, as they seek and construct consensus through their agendas.  
It is of particular interest to those who examine government agendas (and 
certainly of interest to democracy) to explore these complexities. It is of interest that 
governments rarely offer insight into the mechanisms and processes of agenda-setting in 
their addresses, and specifically, whether or not they are actively tracking and carrying 
out, misrepresenting and/or transforming public opinion. It is also of interest that policy 
language tends to be categorical, and represents complex economic, social and fiscal 
issues as nominalizations or universal truths. This latter interest deals directly with 
commonly held ideas and values and their role in complicating issues of power and 
agency at the level of agenda-setting. The potential ideological and political impacts of 
discourse – the extent to which policy articulations and ideas are inculcated, and the 
extent to which they work to construct and sustain social identities, respectively – can be 
explored through examinations of policy as discourse.  
“Albertans” 
Perhaps the most interesting social identity in this analysis has been “Albertans.” I 
am particularly interested in the comparisons Alberta governments make to the rest of 
Canada regarding fiscal, social and economic policy. I view these statements as leverage 
or appeals for consensus. These comparisons often construct Alberta, and Albertans, as 
“the best” or “among the best” in the country. At work is the (re)construction of Alberta 
as a special place in the country, and Albertans as a special people. How Albertans, 
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media, political opposition, and elected politicians who construct the agenda accept, 
contest, and shift these constructs, and how these constructs influence policy making, are 
important considerations in studies of policy in the province, particularly during these 
periods of conflict.  
One policy area of this Alberta identity is taxation, where “preserving” Alberta’s 
tax “advantages” was always a goal for government. Even in 1987 when Getty’s 
government proposed significant tax increases, it pledged to maintain Alberta’s status as 
the lowest overall tax jurisdiction in the country, and articulated taxation as a “burden” 
(and thus something undesirable). As the years progressed there was an increased focus 
on an Alberta “tax advantage” and on Alberta as the most competitive tax jurisdiction in 
the country (and North America). Indeed, the 1992 budget would enhance “Albertans’ 
already substantial tax advantage; Alberta will continue to be the best place in Canada to 
live and work” (Alberta, 1992b, p.385). The following year Klein’s government used the 
phrase “Alberta advantage” under the heading The Economy and Job Creation: 
Promoting the Alberta Advantage.32 
It is unclear if tax policies are a reflection of what “Albertans” desire – to what 
extent governments were responding to active, perceived or anticipated criticism or 
expectations of (not) raising taxes, if this taxing scheme is more precisely a government 
desire, or perhaps, if the “Alberta tax advantage” was more an Alberta (political) 
advantage, where keeping taxes low was leverage for consensus, particularly in the early 
                                                          
 
32 This was the first instance of the term “Alberta Advantage” in any document I 
analyzed.  
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1990s when the government could no longer boast of “the best” economic and social 
policies in Canada (see Taft, 1997; Laxer and Harrison, 1995). It is unclear if government 
is responding to public opinion, or constructing it. While this is unlikely a zero-sum 
scenario, attempts to disentangle this issue could lead to interesting findings regarding 
agenda-setting. Moreover, this discussion should explore how important groups such as 
the media, the political opposition, and perhaps think tanks and academics, locate and 
construct Alberta as a special place, or not (particularly as a special taxation jurisdiction), 
and to what potential effect on policy and policy makers. At play is not only the 
reconstruction of Albertans, but also, of what is expected of Alberta government.  
Recent policy. Peeking into the most recent period of fiscal imbalance, the 
government argued in the 2011 Budget Address: 
Revenue from personal and corporate taxes are expected to increase by 13%.  
To be clear, this is not because taxes are being increased.  
As Premier Stelmach has often said, you cannot tax your way out of recession.  
This government remains firmly committed to maintaining the lowest provincial 
tax regime in Canada – with low personal taxes, low corporate taxes, the lowest 
fuel taxes, the highest personal and spousal tax exemptions, no capital tax, no 
payroll tax – and no sales tax! (p. 4). 
The qualification offered for increased tax revenues (To be clear...), the categorical 
manner in which tax increases are denounced (by citing Premier Stelmach), and the 
“firmly committed” government to maintaining low taxes, all suggest that raising taxes is 
not a consideration for government – that it would be very difficult to reach and construct 
a consensus in proposals to raise taxes. In the most recent budget, the “Alberta 
Advantage” occupies an entire page in the fiscal plan, complete with a bar graph 
comparison to other provinces and a write-up. The “Alberta Advantage” has taken form 
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as an actual policy, and questions surrounding solutions to the deficit, what can and 
cannot be done to solve it, appear as relevant today as in the early 1990s. While Milke 
(2011) has argued that provincial expenditures (operating and capital budgets) were 
viewed by governments in the 1980s and 1990s as “sacrosanct” and points to government 
unwillingness to acknowledge an “overspending issue” as the cause of spiralling deficits 
and debt, I argue that keeping taxes low, and particularly maintaining the “Alberta 
Advantage,” has at times been more sacred than expenditures, that government 
“decisions” and “debates” involving taxation in the province are potentially framed by a 
powerful construct and idea of what it means to be “Albertan,” and that adopting 
“overspending” into policy articulations can only occur in a situation such as Klein’s 
where blame could be shifted away. How this construct is picked up by the various actors 
and groups in the province should receive greater academic attention. Moreover, for all 
the discussion in the literature about Alberta as a politically unique jurisdiction in the 
county, questions surrounding Alberta’s uniqueness have not be posed to Albertans 
specifically.  
On Change and Continuity  
I view this period of provincial politics as one of continuity regarding solutions 
sought for the deficit. This finding challenges the existing literature, particularly Bruce, 
Kneebone, and McKenzie (1997) and Cooper (1996), as well as publications from the 
Fraser Institute, whose works tend to disconnect Klein’s policies from his Conservative 
predecessors Lougheed and (particularly) Getty. While their arguments suggest that Klein 
had the fiscal fortitude to do what Getty could not, or would not, I echo Taft’s and others 
arguments that Klein could only do (and propose to do) what he did because of what had 
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gone on prior to his election as premier. Klein’s policies are thus viewed as a 
culmination, as opposed to a revolution. And, inasmuch as Klein’s government receives 
credit and is acclaimed as something different, new, or changed, I view Klein’s policies 
as a success in terms of rebranding and constructing government as “changed” – a 
success in terms of the priority of consensus.  
There are nuances to this discussion of continuity, however, and there is evidence 
of policy change, or shift, in every year of interest. For example, although Lougheed and 
Getty both articulated the deficit as a revenue and expenditure issue, Getty’s proposals to 
raise taxes in 1987 represents one area of change between the two governments. There is, 
in these different policy proposals, evidence that the definition of a problem does not 
necessarily determine its solution(s) – there is not always a logical “flow” from policy 
issues to their solutions. This brings the discussion back to the policy studies theory and 
literature, and challenges assertions by Birkland (2010) and Hajer (1993) that the 
definition of a problem is an important part of the policy process because it holds 
implications for the choice of solutions. While this may be the case in many instances, it 
is not so in this example of early and mid-1980s taxation policy proposals in the 
province. Nor was it so in the early 1990s when Getty’s and Klein’s governments defined 
the deficit differently, but ultimately pursued similar solutions in a number of policy 
areas (recall Getty’s assertion of a “revenue problem” and Klein’s of a “spending 
problem”). Klein had no spending record of which to speak, and could place blame solely 
on expenditures, and by extension/assumption, upon Getty’s lack of spending control, 
thus distancing his government from Getty’s. Articulating issues is not necessarily 
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logical, or “rational decision-making” and might have less to do with actually solving an 
issue, and more to do with the discursive interest of identity work and consensus seeking.  
A final thought on policy “change.” “Change” is an important theme and word 
in studies of policy, and it is not always evident what manner of “change” is a play. The 
change discussed by Lougheed was one of provincial transition and adjustment, but the 
change that stood out was a shift in taxation as a viable revenue option. With Getty in 
1987, the change was quite the opposite, as taxation emerged as a means to address the 
deficit and fund social programs. Moreover, Getty’s 1987 tax proposals were more 
transparent regarding government decisions than those of Lougheed’s – given the 
potentially controversial issue of tax increases, one might expect language that framed 
tax increases in a manner that disguises government as agent and otherwise naturalizes 
policy processes, as was the case with Lougheed’s (much safer) tax proposals. The 
questions that arise from these “changes,” questions that are not addressed by the existing 
literature, include: why and how did Lougheed’s government shift from taxation as a 
means to fund provincial expenditures; how and why did Getty’s government come to 
focus on taxation as a means to fund provincial expenditures; and, how were these 
different tax proposals received within the legislature and the broader media and public 
opinion context? 
With Getty in 1992 the change was a global, nominalized, agentless “ever-
changing reality.” This change is perhaps the best example in this analysis of government 
discourse that removes government as an agent of blame and obscures the decision-
making process, and otherwise drives towards consensus. And lastly, the change of 
Klein’s government in 1993 was twofold – an active change to government, as well as a 
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fundamental change, and new way of doing things. This latter change speaks directly to 
the discursive priority of consensus seeking, a priority potentially overlooked by 
conceptualisations of policy that do not emphasize language use.   
Limitations and Future Directions: “I Blame Ralph” 
For all the talk of processes and decision making, my research is limited to 
examining only moments or instances thereof. Furthermore, my examination of those 
instances has involved only the transcripts of agenda speeches and not the speeches as 
they occurred, or as recordings. Ultimately, in-depth examinations of agenda setting and 
consensus-seeking calls for a more diverse body of methods, including forms of 
institutional analysis that might include direct observation of these speeches, as well as 
interviews with those who construct and disseminate them. With the ubiquity of the 
internet, the method of distributing government agendas has changed significantly. One 
can go to the government of Alberta website and find a video summary of government 
priorities, conducted by the Premier. Additionally, one can access electronically the 
budget or throne agendas in their entirety, as well as the highlights. These are different 
productions than a speech, and are potentially produced and consumed in different ways. 
Future research should interrogate how government agendas are currently produced, 
distributed, and how these times of economic, fiscal and political conflict play out – not 
just for government, but for Albertans.  
Moreover, future research could build on the discourse that has been documented 
in this analysis by documenting discourse in the media, debate in the legislature and 
amongst the political opposition, as well as the public. I suggest the manner in which we 
(re)construct government, Albertans, and articulate the deficit, is not unlike what I have 
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analyzed on government agendas. I draw attention to a campaign put on by the Alberta 
Alliance in 200433 with the bumper sticker “I blame Ralph” – a loaded and potentially 
powerful categorical construct of government. Government agendas are not the only 
source of categorical assertions and constructs, governments officials are not the only 
people seeking consensus. This is something that also happens in the papers, coffee 
shops, and university classrooms every day in the province, particularly during these 
periods. Tracking multiple agendas and the discourses there-in can provide greater insight 
into how democracy plays out during these periods. 
Conclusion. Much of the extant theory and literature focuses on policy outcomes. 
Consequently, I feel the deficit as a focusing event has been overlooked. Viewing 
government agendas as discourse and thus interactive with people in the broader context 
from within which they emerged leads to queries regarding how the deficit, and 
government policies are understood in the broader perspective by the media, the political 
opposition, and more generally the public. This thesis has offered theoretical insight into 
these complex processes, as well as concrete examples of the kinds of discursive 
practices at play in government agenda speeches, those of convincing, assuming, 
naturalizing, reducing difference, and consensus seeking, all of which point to the 
importance of conceiving and examining language as a constitutive government tool or 
instrument, and – of the discursive production of priorities for government and the 
discursive construction of government itself. This thesis seeks new ways to examine 
                                                          
 
33 I understand this campaign occurred in 2004, well after (and before) the years of 
interest of this thesis. It none the less is an exemplary example of how “government” is 
constructed in the broader context. 
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policy, agenda-setting, and democratic politics in the province of Alberta, particularly in 
times of scarcity and conflict.   
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Appendix A: Keyword Searches 
 
  Keyword Search 
 1983 1984 1987 1992 1993 
 T B T B T B T B T B 
Adjustment 0 6 0 9 1 6 0 1 0 2 
Change(ing) 5 7 5 2 8 5 8 15 35 23 
Reality(ies) 1 13 0 5 2 1 18 1 1 9 
Transition 0 2 0 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Deficit 2 19 0 22 4 28 0 10 3 25 
Consultation    1    1    1    1    5    1 6 4 15 1 
Listen(ing)    0    0    0    0    0     0 10 0 2 5 
My government 38 0 32   0 60 0 66 0 35 0 
 
T= Speech from the Throne 
B= Budgetary Address 
 
 
 
 
